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EVIDENCE-BASED FEDERAL CIVIL
RULEMAKING:
A NEW CONTEMPORANEOUS CASE
CODING RULE
Will Rhee*
Introduction
Consistent with democratic ideals, evidence-based
policymaking (“EBP”) seeks to elevate facts over politics.
Evidence-based federal civil rulemaking attempts to use
objective factual evidence1 to evaluate the effectiveness of new
or proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. As Maurice Rosenberg recognized, “To know the
impact of a rule of civil procedure requires answering but two
straightforward questions: Does the rule work? Does it achieve
the intended results without unacceptable side effects?”2 This
Article proposes a new Federal Rule (the “Model Rule”)
concerning
the
federal
courts’
online
case
management/electronic case filing system (“CM/ECF”).
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. I
thank Jena Martin-Amerson, Megan Annitto, Kelly Behre, Tom Cady, Vince
Cardi, Eric Chaffee, andré cummings, Jean Dailey, Atiba Ellis, Matt Green,
Victor Quintanilla, Dale Olson, Bertha Romine, Mark Spottswood, and Elaine
Wilson for their outstanding comments; Felix Kumah-Abiwu, Dominque
Razzook, and Ron Virts for their excellent research assistance; and the Pace
Law Review staff for their exemplary editing. In addition, this Article was
presented at the June 14, 2012, Ohio Legal Scholarship Workshop and the
January 17, 2013, West Virginia University College of Law Faculty
Colloquium. Finally, I thank the Hodges Research Fund for funding. All
errors are my sole responsibility. I welcome comments at
william.rhee@mail.wvu.edu.
1. For a definition of “evidence,” see infra notes 21-22 and accompanying
text.
2. Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies in the
Administration of Justice, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer 1988, at 13,
14.
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Whenever a party, the court clerk, or the presiding judge in a
civil lawsuit electronically files a document, the Model Rule
requires her to answer standardized online questions about
that document.3 These questions are limited to indisputable
factual information about case-related outcomes.4 By
answering these questions, the filer codes research variables5
contemporaneously with the filing of every document. Such
mandatory
contemporaneous
coding
would
provide
comprehensive, reliable, and inexpensive descriptive empirical
data6 for evidence-based rulemaking. This Federal Courts
CM/ECF Descriptive Dataset (“FCCEDD”—pronounced “fuhsaid” for short) should be publicly available.
For example, assume that a judge7 has finished writing her
memorandum order ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
She wants to enter the order on CM/ECF. The judge would log
on to CM/ECF using her assigned log-in and password, select
the “order” option from an online drop down menu,8 and then
3. As explained further below, the Rule requires responses to a uniform
national set of mandatory questions and encourages responses to any
jurisdiction-specific voluntary questions that an individual court may choose
to add. See infra Part IV.
4. Case-related “outcomes” are facts idiosyncratic to the specific lawsuit
about personal characteristics (e.g., judge’s name, party’s name, counsel’s
name, location of party’s residence/headquarters), arguments (e.g., the stated
legal basis for each of the three causes of action in the complaint—what a
side is claiming regardless of the claim’s actual legal merit), and litigation
results (e.g., the fact the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss in
full). See generally Will Rhee, Entitled to Be Heard: Improving EvidenceBased Policy Making Through Audience and Public Reason, 85 IND. L.J. 1315,
1317-18 (2010). For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
5. “Coding variables” is “the process of translating properties or
attributes of the world (i.e., variables) into a form that researchers can
systematically analyze after they have chosen the appropriate measures to
tap the underlying variable of interest.” Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin,
Coding Variables, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321 (Kimberly
Kempf-Leonard ed. 2005) [hereinafter Epstein & Martin, Coding Variables].
6. Empirical data are the product of empirical research. For a definition
of “empirical research,” see infra note 23.
7. Although most of the examples in this Article concern the federal
district court, the same principles apply to all federal courts. There is no
reason why contemporaneous coding cannot be applied to specialized federal
courts, the circuit courts, and the Supreme Court.
8. A “drop down menu” is a “horizontal list of options that each contain a
vertical menu. When you roll over or click one of the primary options in a
drop down menu, a list of choices will ‘drop down’ below the main menu.”
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select the defendant’s motion for summary judgment previously
filed in the case to associate her order as a response to that
motion. At this point, a dialog box9 would pop up in CM/ECF
asking the judge a set of standardized research questions about
the content of her order. To answer the questions, the judge
would either select further options in additional drop down
menus or enter the appropriate text in blank boxes. By
answering these questions, the judge would code outcome
variables about her order contemporaneously with her filing of
that order. Only after the judge has finished answering all
required questions would CM/ECF let her complete
electronically filing the order.
As most orders to be filed by a court are drafted by a party,
the party’s attorney or pro se party has not only the best
knowledge of the case but also a sanctionable duty of candor to
the court under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.10 The coding of the electronic file is likely to be
highly reliable under the watchful eyes of opposing counsel and
the judge. Because the coding also is directly associated with
the underlying source document, the court, opposing counsel, or
a researcher can easily confirm the coding’s accuracy. Because
the coding merely describes the underlying source document, it
lacks legal precedential authority independent of its underlying

Drop
Down
Menu,
TECHTERMS.COM,
http://www.techterms.com/definition/dropdownmenu (last visited Noc. 24,
2012).
9. A “dialog box” initiates a “dialog with the user. It is a window that
pops up on the screen with options that the user can select. After the
selections have been made, the user can typically click ‘OK’ to enter the
changes or ‘Cancel’ to discard the selections.” Dialog Box, TECHTERMS.COM,
http://www.techterms.com/definition/dialogbox (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Although lawyers might be loath to file for Rule 11
sanctions against other lawyers, there is anecdotal evidence that the current
version of Rule 11 “has caused litigators to undertake some disinterested
evaluation and certification in their everyday practice.” Sung Hui Kim,
Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REV. 73, 118
n.279 (2010). A 2005 Federal Judicial Center survey of 278 federal district
court judges concluded that eighty percent of surveyed judges agreed: “Rule
11 is needed and is just right as it now stands.” DAVID RAUMA & THOMAS E.
WILLGING, REPORT OF A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES’
EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 2 (2005).
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source document.11 Furthermore, because the FCCEDD shall
be open to the public online and be searchable by name, both
the court and counsel will have personal incentives to ensure
the coding’s accuracy and thereby protect their public
reputation.
While the current CM/ECF system is mandated in a
decentralized fashion through local rules,12 only a new uniform
Federal Rule can guarantee the centralized coding and
collection necessary to create useful baseline data. Although
adversaries can continue to disagree over the interpretation of
this data, the required online coding of case outcomes
simultaneous with the electronic filing of case documents
should provide an objective, universally acceptable starting
point for debate. Because all law seeks to influence aggregate
human behavior,13 it must rely upon implicit or explicit
empirical assumptions about how humans behave. To
maximize law’s effectiveness, therefore, those empirical
assumptions must be tested. If those underlying assumptions
prove inaccurate, then the corresponding laws should be
amended accordingly.14
This Model Rule is ripe for consideration now. At present,
the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts is poised to begin
designing the “Next Generation of CM/ECF” to replace the
current system.15 The federal courts already operate “the
world’s most transparent court system.”16 Implementing this
Model Rule in the next generation CM/ECF system would take
transparency and evidence-based rulemaking to a higher level.
11. In this limited respect, mandatory case coding is analogous to the
Reporter of Decisions’s syllabus to a Supreme Court decision. See United
States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906). For further
discussion, see also infra Part IV.A.2.
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
13. See Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 34 (2011).
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.
15. The Third Branch, Task Force Elicits User Views on “Next Gen”
CM/ECF,
U.S.
CRTS.
(Apr.
2012,
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/12-0401/Task_Force_Elicits_User_Views_on_Next_Gen_CM_ECF.aspx. For further
discussion, see infra notes 291-99 and accompanying text.
16. Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481,
484 (2009).
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This thesis is examined in four parts. Part I explains why
evidence-based policymaking needs not only objective
descriptive data to provide a universal baseline for policy
evaluation but also a paradigm shift in the way evidence is
viewed and used in policymaking. Part II reviews the history of
empirical research of federal civil rulemaking from its humble
beginning, through its acceptance and institutionalization, to
today’s so-called “New Legal Realist” or “Empirical Legal
Studies” movement.17 Part III summarizes the CM/ECF
revolution in the federal courts and explains how
contemporaneous coding can code more federal cases at less
cost than current methods. Finally, Part IV explains the
proposed empirical coding Model Rule and provides sample
coding outcomes.
I.

Evidence-Based Policymaking

The words “evidence-based” in evidence-based federal civil
rulemaking refer to the larger evidence-based policymaking
(“EBP”) movement.18 EBP is “a policy process that helps
planners make better-informed decisions by putting the best
available evidence at the centre of the policy process.”19 To
attempt to accomplish such a lofty goal, EBP employs
evaluative research, “the primary objective of which is to
determine the extent to which a given program or procedure is
achieving some desired result. The ‘success’ of an evaluation
17. For further discussion, see infra Part II.C.
18. See, e.g., KAREN BOGENSCHNEIDER & THOMAS J. CORBETT, EVIDENCEBASED POLICYMAKING (2010); WHAT WORKS? EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY AND
PRACTICE IN PUBLIC SERVICES (Huw T.O. Davies et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter
WHAT WORKS?]; William Solesbury, Evidence Based Policy: Whence it Came
and Where it’s Going (ESRC UK Ctr. for Evidence Based Pol’y & Practice,
Working
Paper
No.
1,
2001),
available
at
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/politicaleconomy/research/cep/pubs/pa
pers/assets/wp1.pdf; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 901, 910 (2011); Rhee, supra note 4, at 1317.
19. Marco Segone, Evidence-Based Policy Making and The Role of
Monitoring and Evaluation within the New Aid Environment, in BRIDGING
THE GAP: THE ROLE OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION IN EVIDENCE-BASED
POLICY MAKING 16, 27 (Marco Segone ed. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted),
available
at
http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/evidence_based_policy_making.pdf.
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project will be largely dependent upon its usefulness to the
administrator in improving services.”20 Of the two types of
policymaking, intuitive and analytical,21 EBP is much more
analytical. But even intuitive decision making needs to be
informed by some evidence to avoid jumping to conclusions.22
All policymaking thus relies upon evidence to some degree.
Evidence implies verifiable facts, not unsupported theories or
hunches. Although the most common source of such evidence is
empirical research,23 the concept of evidence is broader than
research.24 Implicit in EBP is the premise that the most
20. Christina A. Christie & Marvin C. Alkin, An Evaluation Theory Tree,
in EVALUATION ROOTS: TRACING THEORISTS’ VIEWS AND INFLUENCES 12, 22
(Marvin C. Alkin ed. 2004) (citing EDWARD SUCHMAN, EVALUATIVE RESEARCH
21 (1967)).
21. PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING,
DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND
POLICYMAKERS 21-25 (2010) (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 23-24 (citations omitted). In the policymaking context,
intuitive decision making is best for quick decisions made under time
pressure with incomplete information. Id. at 22-23. Because the scope of this
Article is limited to deliberative decision making where lawmakers can take
their time to gather and analyze evidence, intuitive decision making does not
apply here. If there is insufficient time to gather and analyze evidence, EBP
is impossible.
23. “Empirical research” is
[I]nformation collected through systematic observation and
experience (in contrast, for example, to information derived
through theory or logic). . . . Generally, an empirical
statement is one that can be proven wrong. Empirical
research designs encompass experimental research, quasiexperimental research, observational studies, and case
studies. Research methods include surveys and focus
groups. Empirical research can take place in the field, in a
laboratory, or even in a library setting. Samples of subjects
to be studied can be selected on a random basis or for the
convenience of the researcher. Empirical research can be
reported on a quantitative or qualitative basis.
Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil
Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1126 (2002) (footnote omitted).
Whereas quantitative research is a “strategy that emphasizes quantification
in the collection and analysis of data,” qualitative research is a “strategy that
usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and
analysis of data.” ALAN BRYMAN, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 380 (4th ed.
2012).
24. Solesbury, supra note 18, at 8.
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effective evidence, rather than merely any evidence, should
guide policy. Three “R” questions can guide the selection of
evidence for EBP: “[H]ow relevant is this to what we are
seeking to understand or decide? [H]ow representative is this of
the population that concerns us? [H]ow reliable, how wellfounded—theoretically, empirically—is it?”25
Lawmakers would not champion—at least publicly—
“evidence-ignoring” policy. Nevertheless, there are many
examples of policymakers appearing to ignore considerable
contrary evidence because of ideology or self-interest.26 Just as
people can have a sense of injustice without being able to
precisely define justice,27 EBP may be easier to define in its
absence. Indeed, some policies are more driven by evidence
than others.
EBP assumes that the best solution to a legal problem first
requires an open-minded review of relevant objective factual
evidence about the problem. Such evidence should then inform
the formulation and selection of a possible policy solution.28
Evidence should drive policy. EBP supports the idea that
evidence is essential not only during initial policy development,
but also throughout the entire policy cycle.29 Objective factual
evidence can not only be used to assess a new policy’s impact
on a problem, but also to provide lawmakers with feedback to
inform subsequent policy revisions. Ideally, lawmakers would
25. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis in original).
26. For example, American federal policymakers continue to take little
action over climate change despite the considerable scientific evidence that
climate change is indeed occurring. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE ix (2010), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12782.
27. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 4-5 (2009).
28. See Martin Partington, Empirical Legal Research and PolicyMaking, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 1002, 1004
(Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer, eds. 2010).
29. See, e.g., NORMAN BLAIKIE, DESIGNING SOCIAL RESEARCH: THE LOGIC
OF ANTICIPATION 74 (2d ed. 2010) (citing CAROL H. WEISS, EVALUATION
RESEARCH: METHODS FOR ASSESSING PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 4, 6 (1972));
Ruth Levitt et al., Evidence for Accountability: The Nature and Uses of
Evidence in the Audit, Inspection and Scrutiny Functions of Government in
the UK (ESRC UK Ctr. for Evidence Based Pol’y and Practice, Working Paper
No.
24,
2006),
available
at
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/politicaleconomy/research/cep/pubs/pa
pers/paper-24.aspx.
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test promising policy ideas through controlled, randomized
experiments and use the resulting data to decide which policy
idea to implement on a larger scale.30
EBP cannot avoid politics because evaluation, “both as a
process and in terms of research findings, affect[s] and [is]
affected by the political context.”31 In light of the inherent
politics of democracy, too often lawmakers do not choose policy
based on evidence, but rather on “ideology, values, political
interests, and other influences that are beyond the reach of the
knowledge broker.”32 This political context has become
unavoidable with the “massive rise” in the twentieth century of
partisan “pressure groups of one sort or another, university
researchers, independent ‘think-tanks[,’] professional bodies
and statutory organizations[,]” which seek “explicitly to advise
or influence government[]. . . .”33
Once committed to a particular policy, lawmakers may
pick and choose only evidence that agrees with their pet
policy.34 Such opinion-based policy “relies heavily on either the
selective use of evidence (e.g.[,] on single studies irrespective of
30. See, e.g., BLAIKIE, supra note 29, at 36; BRYMAN, supra note 23, at 5051; JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 81 (7th ed. 2010); Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Quantitative
Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 901, 903 (Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer eds.
2010) [hereinafter Epstein & Martin, Quantitative Approaches]; Michael
Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 931 (2011). See
generally ROBERT F. BORUCH, RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENTS FOR PLANNING AND
EVALUATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (C. Deborah Laughton et al. eds., 1997).
31. Christie & Alkin, supra note 20, at 29 (citing CAROL WEISS,
EVALUATION RESEARCH IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 214 (1991)).
32. BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 18, at 261 (citing Carol
Weiss, Research-Policy Linkages: How Much Influence Does Social Science
Research Have?, in UNESCO, WORLD SOCIAL SCIENCE REPORT 1999, at 194205).
33. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 1.
34. See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS
THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 112-115 (2007); Charles Lord et al., Biased
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098,
2106 (1979); Robert MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of
Research Results, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 267 (1998); Monica Prasad et
al., “There Must Be a Reason”: Osama, Saddam, and Inferred Justification,
79 SOC. INQUIRY 142, 155 (2009).
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quality) or on the untested views of individuals or groups, often
inspired by ideological standpoints, prejudices, or speculative
conjecture.”35 Aware of this tendency, partisan pressure groups
eagerly assemble and present partisan “evidence” of varying
quality to supportive lawmakers so that these lawmakers can
claim the persuasive power of evidence without ever having
really used it in their decision making.36 In this instance, policy
drives evidence.
Claiming the persuasive power of evidence can be an
effective political response to the rising skepticism of and
cynicism about democratic government from “an increasingly
educated, informed and questioning public” seeking
reassurance that its taxes are being used effectively.37 To such
a skeptical public, the ideal of EBP has a rhetorical appeal “as
a means of ensuring that what is being done is worthwhile and
that it is being done in the best possible way.”38 For example, in
1997, a United Kingdom Labour government “was elected with
the philosophy of ‘what matters is what works’—on the face of
it signaling a conscious retreat from political ideology.”39
Apparently, this political strategy did not “work” because the
Labour Party was voted out of office in 2010 and became the
opposition party.40
The convergence of a number of contemporary conditions
makes EBP appear more promising. In addition to an
increasingly well-informed public seeking greater government
accountability, the proliferation of cheap, easily accessible
information technology—such as the internet—has contributed
to the symbiotic expansion of the research community’s size
and capabilities.41

35. Segone, supra note 19, at 27.
36. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 1.
37. Id. at 1-2.
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id. at 1.
40. See John F. Burns, British Labour Party Looks to Rebuild, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
16,
2010,
at
A4,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/europe/17britain.html?_r=0.
41. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 2.
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Federal civil rulemaking paradoxically presents both
promise and peril for EBP. The federal civil rules and its
rulemaking process are promising for EBP. Contrary to the
federal criminal rules, where the government’s obligation to
prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt inhibits
transparent information sharing,42 the federal civil rules, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, encourage such
transparency.43
Moreover, the custodian of the federal civil rules takes its
job very seriously.44 Composed of appointed expert judges,
lawyers, and law professors,45 the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee (the “Advisory Committee”) currently appears to
value empirical research in its slow and cautious deliberations
over any possible rules amendments. As then chair Mark R.
Kravitz explained three years ago, the Advisory Committee is
“committed to gathering empirical data about the operation of
the rules and any proposed rule changes so that we better
understand the likely effect of rule revisions. Gathering and
analyzing empirical data takes time.”46 Also, three years ago,
former chair, Judge Lee Rosenthal, reiterated that the
Advisory Committee is “committed to getting more empirical
information . . . and we know we have only started.”47
42. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 & advisory committee’s notes
(explaining discovery in federal criminal cases); Mary Prosser, Reforming
Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 541, 549-53.
43. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“Mutual knowledge
of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation.”). See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed:
The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 691 (1998).
44. For example, a former Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee,
Judge Lee Rosenthal, commented that she thought “that a glass of red wine
and the pocket part of Moores or Wright & Miller is a great Saturday night”
and that discussing changes to the rules “is the most interesting question in
the world, right up there with the meaning of life.” Alexander Dimitrief et al.,
Update on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 211,
211 (2010) (statement of Judge Rosenthal).
45. See Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to Revise: That is the
Question, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 216-17 (2010).
46. Id. at 217 (footnote omitted).
47. Dimitrief et al., supra note 44, at 242 (statement of Judge
Rosenthal).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3

10

RHEE

70

2/28/2013 9:47 PM

Final

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

Demonstrating that perhaps the lesson had sunk in, the former
chair later interjected, “[s]ounds like we need some more of
that empirical research to answer that question.”48
Furthermore, the Federal Judicial Center, the
congressionally created judicial think-tank,49 can provide the
Advisory Committee with professional empirical research upon
request.50 This expert Committee has a tradition of
recommending the “best rules rather than rules that might be
supported most widely or might appease special interests.”51
The Advisory Committee’s empirically informed annual rules
amendments crafted “with exacting and meticulous care”52 are
insulated from, and yet are still accountable to, popular
democracy. Although these amendments become law by
default, Congress retains the power to reject them.53
In contrast, the federal civil litigation’s adversarial
system54 and high cost55 are perilous for EBP. Law unavoidably
48. Id. at 245.
49. See infra Part II.B.2 for further discussion.
50. Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial
Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 31, 39-40 (1988). The FJC has declined Committee research requests
only a few times, apparently with mutual consent. William W. Schwarzer,
Tribute, The Federal Judicial Center and the Administration of Justice in the
Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1129, 1141 & n.46 (1995) (citing Report
of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Relationship between the Federal
Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 7
(Sept. 24, 1991) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center)).
51. Daniel R. Coquillette, A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking:
A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee
on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 685 (1995) (Report prepared by Thomas E.
Baker and Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook).
52. Judge Thomas F. Hogan, The Federal Rules of Practice and
Procedure,
U.S.
CRTS.
(Oct.
2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingP
rocess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx.
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006).
54. Stephan Landsman, Introduction to the Adversary System, in
READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 1 (Stephen Landsman ed. 1988).
55. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL
REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS
TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN
LEGAL
SYSTEM
2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/Conte
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relies upon politics and competing normative assumptions.56
The zero-sum character of litigation means there is almost
always a loser and a winner. Furthermore, the rules—although
seemingly neutral on their face—incorporate policy tradeoffs
that unavoidably favor or burden one adversary more than the
other.57 While the Advisory Committee can attempt to calibrate
the commensurate level of favoritism or burden at each stage of
litigation, the ultimate tradeoffs contained in the rules are the
inevitable by-product of the adversarial system.58
Thus, in public debate over the rules, not surprisingly selfinterest reigns: defense-friendly interests seek defense-friendly
rules, and plaintiff-friendly interests seek plaintiff-friendly
rules.59 And if their adversary brandishes empirical research
against them, then that research must either be obvious or
wrong.60 In the context of adversarial litigation, often the only
acceptable empirical research is that which agrees with one’s
position.61 Viewing evidence through a biased, self-interested
lens is integral to the adversarial system.62
ntDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008.
56. See Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 917-18. “Norms” are “[s]tandards
for how one ought to act. . . . In the terms of practical reasoning, norms are
standards that give reasons for action.” BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL
THEORY 149 (2004). The word “normative” implies “[w]hat ought to be done.
The normative aspect of a discussion or a set of facts is its implications for
how people should act, how rules should be changed, or even how theories
should be constructed.” Id. at 148. Normative questions are “‘should’
questions, questions about how individuals or institutions should behave.”
Aaron Rappaport, The Logic of Legal Theory: Reflections on the Purpose and
Methodology of Jurisprudence, 73 MISS. L.J. 559, 572 (2004).
57. See Alan Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly
Functioning Civil Procedure System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993, 995 (2012).
58. Id. at 995-997.
59. See Arthur Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 (2010) (discussing
FED. R. CIV. P. 8).
60. Pioneering empiricist and Advisory Committee member Maurice
Rosenberg said that there are “two kinds of empirical data bearing on courts:”
(1) “the kind that lawyers and judges dismiss as a demonstration of the
obvious; of course, they say, we already knew that” and (2) “data that lawyers
and judges dismiss as counterintuitive; nuts, they say, that cannot be so.”
Paul Carrington, Maurice Rosenberg, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1901, 1903 (1995);
see also Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 29.
61. See supra note 34.
62. See Christopher P. Guzelian & John F. Pfaff, Evidence Based Policy
1, 21-22 (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 976,376, 2007),
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Karen Bogenschneider and Thomas Corbett, two leading
researchers at the Institute of Research on Poverty at the
University of Wisconsin—Madison (“IRP”),63 have confirmed
that such bias is not limited to litigation. Combined,
Bogenschneider and Corbett have decades of personal
experience in seeking EBP and have considerable credibility in
the field. Founded in 1966, the IRP was the first federally
sponsored academic think-tank devoted to “poverty-related
investigations.”64 Based on their experience with povertyrelated investigations, a hot-button political issue, and
qualitative research of EBP efforts in the United States,
Bogenschneider and Corbett concluded that the
story of U.S. social policy reveals a disturbing
disconnect between the research community . . .
and the policymaking community. . . . Although
the quality of research has expanded
dramatically in recent decades, its role in
shaping policy decisions seldom matches the
level warranted by the magnitude of the
investment in science by government and the
philanthropic communities, among others. This
is
a
conundrum
demanding
thoughtful
attention.65
There are of course exceptions to this general disconnect. For
instance, the fact that the Advisory Committee values
evaluative research in its policymaking66 is a key motivation
behind this Article. Such exceptions notwithstanding, however,
most commentators appear to concur with this dismal
assessment.67 A presidential candidate’s “love of data” was once
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976376. For an argument that empirical
research of civil rulemaking is somewhat an exercise in futility because it has
not resulted in actual rules change, see infra note 107.
63. BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 18, at iii.
64. Id. at 6.
65. Id. at ix.
66. For further discussion, see infra Part II.B.1.
67. BRIDGING RESEARCH AND POLICY IN DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE AND THE
CHANGE PROCESS ix (Julius Court et al., eds., 2005); Huw Davies et al.,
Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice in Public Services, in WHAT

13

RHEE

Final

2/28/2013 9:47 PM

2013] EVIDENCE-BASED FED. CIVIL RULEMAKING

73

criticized by a commentator who stated: “See how many votes
data gets you!”68 Perhaps such pessimism is not surprising
because “politics is more about the art of the possible or
generally acceptable than what is rational or might work
best.”69 In general, policymaking in a democracy,70 particularly
in the United States,71 appears to be based on evidence
selectively, if at all.

WORKS?, supra note 18, at 31-32; RAY PAWSON, EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY: A
REALIST PERSPECTIVE viii, 1-2 (2006).
68. Howard Fineman, Rep. Paul Ryan VP Choice Draws Criticism from
Some Conservatives, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 11, 2012, 2:55 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/howard-fineman/rep-paul-ryanvp_b_1768137.html. In an interview with former President Bill Clinton,
comedian Jon Stewart satirically demonstrated this disconnect when he
quipped:
The idea that you would use (thunderous applause and
laughter) you would use in your argument; I know, this is
interesting; that you thought that you would utilize in your
argument . . . facts (laughter). And they would have; you
would attach numbers to them that were real (laughter). I
thought it was a bold choice on your part.
hungrycoyote, President Bill Clinton: “The problem with any ideology . . .”
UPDATED with transcripts of both parts, DAILY KOS (Sept. 21, 2012, 3:28
AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/09/21/1134679/-President-BillClinton-The-problem-with-any-ideology.
69. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 14 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 30.
71. Id. at 31-32. British researchers ironically observed that the U.S.
might have the best evidence and the worst EBP:
The apparent lack of influence of social scientists in the
USA may seem surprising given the USA’s strong
reputation for policy analysis and evaluation. There seems
to be an inverse relationship operating here. The USA has a
reputation for careful evaluation research but in the
fragmented and decentralized political economy of that
country this is often single-issue research, focusing on shortrun effects and used for political ammunition rather than
policy planning.
Id.
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A. Policymaking Selectively Based on Evidence
The personal experience of two thoughtful, respected,
policymaking experts demonstrates the selective use of
evidence in American legislation.72 First, Ron Haskins has
examined welfare policy from the perspective of the federal
government, the academy, and the non-governmental
organization (NGO) domain.73 In light of Haskins’s extensive
welfare policy experience in government, the academy, and
NGOs, he is well-informed to opine on the state of EBP in
federal welfare policy. When asked by welfare policy academics
how influential research was in an ongoing contentious
congressional debate about welfare reform, Haskins estimated,
based upon his personal experience, that “the best research
might exert 5% of the total influence on the policy debate, with

72. The complex nature of policymaking makes quantitative studies of
EBP effectiveness methodologically difficult. As a result, most EBP
effectiveness studies tend to be qualitative. Cf. Guzelian & Pfaff, supra note
62, at 8-9 & n.17 (limiting their empirical research to quantitative data).
Ironically, there is “little evidence” that EBP actually works. “It remains an
act of faith.” Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and
Practice in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 29-31. There is
thereby a need for empirical research on the impact of empirical research on
law and policy-making. Partington, supra note 28, at 1003.
73. Haskins served in the U.S. federal government as President George
W. Bush’s Senior Advisor for Welfare Policy; Majority Staff Director,
Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
House of Representatives; and Welfare Counsel, Republican Staff,
Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
House of Representatives. Ron Haskins, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
http://www.brookings.edu/experts/haskinsr (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). He
also served in the academic field as a Research Professor at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Frank Porter Graham Child Development
Center. Id. At present, he is a policy expert at the non-profit Brookings
Institution, where he is Co-Director of the Center on Children and Families,
an Expert for the Budgeting for National Priorities Project, and a Senior
Fellow for the Economic Studies Program. Id. Haskins also is a Senior
Consultant at the Annie E. Casey Foundation and a Senior Editor of the joint
Princeton University-Brookings journal The Future of Children. Id; see also
About,
THE
FUTURE
OF
CHILDREN,
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/about/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2012).
The Future of Children even has an EBP mission, “to translate the best social
science research about children and youth into information that is useful to
policymakers, practitioners, grant-makers, advocates, the media, and
students of public policy.” Id.

15

RHEE

Final

2/28/2013 9:47 PM

2013] EVIDENCE-BASED FED. CIVIL RULEMAKING

75

an upside potential of 10%.”74 He added that “[p]ersonal values
and political power” were “what really mattered in Congress.”75
Second, an anonymous “distinguished state welfare official,
who also has held a top research-oriented position in the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services,” provided another
example of how narrowly policymakers can view evidence.76
The anonymous official managed to convince a “key” Florida
state legislator to sponsor welfare reform legislation. When
critiquing the draft bill, the official “asked for additional
resources to evaluate whether the proposed changes might be
effective.”77 The Florida legislator responded “with incredulity:
‘If you don’t know whether or not the program is going to work,
why are you asking me to sponsor it?’”78 From that statement,
the legislator demonstrated ignorance of both the (un)certainty
of policy research and the continuing need to evaluate policy in
action. Objective baseline descriptive data are essential not
only to formulate policy but also to evaluate its subsequent
effectiveness.
B. The Need for Objective Baseline Descriptive Data
As Sherlock Holmes observed, “It is a capital mistake to
theorize before you have all the evidence. It biases the
judgment.”79 It is axiomatic that before you can even attempt to
solve a problem, you first must diagnose the problem. For
example, if your problem is financial debt, spending more than
you make, then the first step is to diagnose how you currently
spend your money. After meticulously tracking how you spend
every penny over a month, you then would have enough
diagnostic descriptive data to start making decisions about how
to change your spending patterns and solve your debt problem.
Any changes you made before collecting the diagnostic
descriptive data would be based upon feeling or hunch.
74. BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 18, at 1.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, A STUDY IN SCARLET 27 (Simon & Brown
1979) (1887).
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“Lawyers, including judges and law professors, have been lazy
about subjecting their hunches—which in honesty we should
admit are often little better than prejudices—to systematic
empirical testing.”80
After carefully reviewing this “evidence,” you might create
a new “policy”—a new monthly budget. After implementing
this new budget, you would still want to continue to track your
actual spending to determine whether your policy in action was
working to solve your problem and lower your debt. After
reviewing this additional descriptive evidence, you might
tweak your budget further. Each time you revise your policy,
you will want to continue to collect and review additional
descriptive evidence to evaluate your policy’s factual success in
solving your problem.
While this example is admittedly much simpler than most
contemporary public policy problems, it illustrates a
fundamental need for baseline descriptive data to evaluate the
success of any policy in solving problems. The “best way to
define something as a problem ‘in our profoundly numerical
contemporary culture’ is to measure it.”81 Descriptive data
simply “describe[] the state of the world.”82 Because law is the
primary means by which governments implement policy, “it
seems logical to suggest that policymakers should have as
much understanding as possible of how law works in the real
world.”83 Roscoe Pound observed the disparity between the “law
in books” and the “law in action.”84 It is well understood that
policies once implemented in the real world may have
unintended results. The only way to examine such unintended
results comprehensively is through descriptive data.
80. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 366, 367 (1986).
81. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and
the Politics of Ideas: Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 71,
91 (quoting DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 136
(1988)).
82. ROBERT LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 29-30 (2010).
83. Partington, supra note 28, at 1006.
84. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12,
15 (1910) (“[T]he distinction between legal theory and judicial administration
is often a very real and a very deep one.”).
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For descriptive data to serve as a baseline for policy
debates, however, that data must be truly objective.85 All sides
in a policy debate must accept the descriptive data’s relevance,
representativeness, and reliability.86 In the civil litigation
context, the accurate description of litigation lawsuits is
essential to knowledgeable policymaking about litigation
85. In an important forthcoming article, Mark Spottswood proposes a
measurement protocol for measuring “[o]utcome accuracy—meaning a
correspondence between the factual understandings that motivate legal
decisionmakers and the historical facts that gave rise to litigation.” Mark
Spottswood, Evidence-Based Litigation Reform, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 25,
27 (2012). His protocol “entails obtaining a record of what facts motivate
those who are responsible for producing legal outcomes, and then comparing
those beliefs with the results of a more detailed, in-depth investigation into
the factual background of the case.” Id. Unlike Spottswood’s outcomeaccuracy data, this Article’s descriptive data focuses on objective factual case
outcomes over which all parties in a lawsuit could agree (e.g., was the motion
to dismiss granted?) without evaluating whether these factual case outcomes
accurately reflect the underlying facts of the case and a fair understanding of
such facts by a reasonable judge (e.g., was the grant of summary judgment
accurate because the plaintiff’s claim lacked merit?). Although a particular
district court could implement Spottswood’s outcome-accuracy protocol as
part of the voluntary coding of the proposed Rule, see infra Part IV.B, as
Spottswood himself recognizes, it would “be expensive and difficult” to
implement his outcome-accuracy protocol in every newly filed CM/ECF case.
Spottswood, supra, at 29. Because parties most likely would disagree over the
perceived accuracy of such case outcomes, coding such accuracy would
probably require his experimental protocol and “reference-standard
evaluators” in nearly every case. Id. at 85. Nevertheless, Spottswood is
correct that
[s]o long as we fail to measure accuracy, information about
the variables we can track cannot provide a strong platform
on which to base rule-design decisions, because we can
never be sure that the improvements in other procedural
values are not coming at the expense of the system’s
accuracy.
Id. at 29. In the final analysis, much like using both inexpensive
observational data such as “cholesterol levels or blood pressure” and
“something that is harder to measure, like long-term changes in mortality or
subjective assessments of overall patient well-being” in medicine, id. at 68,
both this Article’s outcome-based descriptive data and Spottswood’s outcomeaccuracy data can prove useful in analyzing the effectiveness of the rules.
There is value in using both “easily measurable surrogate outcomes and also
more subjective ultimate outcomes of deeper theoretic interest, depending on
the specific goals of an investigation.” Id. at 81.
86. See Solesbury, supra note 18, at 8-9.
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reform.87 Given the proliferation of partisan pressure groups
happy to manufacture self-serving, subjective “evidence,”88
there is a danger of evidence overload. Furthermore, different
academic disciplines and different research cultures disagree
over the objectivity of various research methods.89 If
policymakers mistrust all evidence as loaded, then they might
feel justified paradoxically to ignore evidence altogether.90
Objective baseline descriptive data would prevent such a
paradox.
Because descriptive data are simple, so long as its
collection and coding process is transparent, the most jaded
ideologues and most doctrinaire academics would have
difficulty spinning its interpretation. If there is popular
consensus over the accuracy of descriptive data, then there
should be greater popular support for EBP rationally based
upon such data. Even if ideologues and academics continue to
argue over the correct interpretation of such descriptive data,
the descriptive data will have served their public purpose of
providing a shared baseline upon which to ground policy
debates. The distinction between descriptive data and their
normative interpretation parallels the distinction between
positive economics and normative economics.91
87. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything about the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1147, 1149 (1992).
88. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
89. See Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and
Practice in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 3; Rhee, supra
note 4, at 1317.
90. Elizabeth Warren has pointed out that there is a “vigorous market
for data” in the policymaking world, often “to support foregone conclusions.”
Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social
Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 3. “Ironically, the power of
this market threatens to crush serious, policy-directed, empirical work. . . .
Indeed, the market is creating an anti-market in which one study seems to
contradict another, leaving policymakers free to ignore all data and making
such scholarship not only difficult, but useless.” Id. at 3-4.
91. Whereas “positive economics” are descriptive statements “about how
the world is,” “normative economics” are proscriptive statements “about how
the world ought to be.” N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS
31, 136, 491 (6th ed. 2010). Peter Boettke uses a “devil’s test” to distinguish
between the two. Under this test, “the analysis could be agreed upon by either
an angel or the devil, but the angel and devil would differ on the normative
implications.” PETER J. BOETTKE, LIVING ECONOMICS: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND,
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Ideally, independent, professional civil servants similar to
the U.S. Census Bureau92 would be responsible for collecting,
disseminating, maintaining, and improving such descriptive
data. Not only could impartial civil servants safeguard the
data’s objectivity, but also such professionals could
dispassionately assess partisan criticisms of their research
methodology and make constructive improvements.93 Over
time, all legitimate sides in a policy debate could accept in good
faith that the relevant descriptive data provide a fair factual
starting point. This fair starting point is even more important
in light of the increasingly partisan nature of modern media,
where anyone can obtain her news only from sources that share
her own ideological bias.94 Even the fairest starting point,
however, is useful only if lawmakers actually agree to use it as
shared common ground.
C. A Paradigm Shift
Perhaps the most common objection to EBP is that the
“variables underlying” policymaking cannot “be quantified and
TOMORROW 28-29 (2012). This test distinguishes “economic knowledge from
normative concerns or preferences.” Diana Weinert Thomas & Michael David
Thomas, Encouraging a Productive Research Agenda: Peter Boettke and the
Devil’s Test, 26 J. PRIV. ENTER. 103, 104 (2010).
92. The Constitution and a federal statute mandate that the U.S.
Census Bureau every decade collect demographic information about the
United States “to draw political boundaries, allocate funds to state and local
governments, and track a wide range of demographic and economic
information.” Brendan Kearns, Down for the Count: Overcoming the Census
Bureau’s Neglect of the Homeless, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 155, 160 (2012)
(citations omitted).
93. For a discussion on the role of a proposed National Academy of
Justice to oversee the FCCEDD, see infra notes 450-55 and accompanying
text.
94. For example, former Vice President Cheney may watch only Fox
News, and lawyer and consumer advocate Ralph Nader may read only
Mother Jones. AYRES, supra note 34, at 21; see also Lymari Morales,
Americans’ Confidence in Television News Drops to New Low, GALLUP (July
10,
2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155585/Americans-ConfidenceTelevision-News-Drops-New-Low.aspx (surveyed adults expressing “a great
deal or quite a lot of confidence” in U.S. TV news was twenty-one percent and
in U.S. newspapers was twenty-five percent). All policymakers need to be
exposed not only to challenging opposing points of view, but also to objective
facts that transcend political spin.
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reduced to a non-discretionary algorithm.”95 Even assuming
this is true, policy nevertheless can be empirically tested to see
if it is actually achieving the promised or expected outcomes.96
Nothing beats results. By analogy, although modeling the
detailed intricacies of a football team’s play calling and
execution might be extremely difficult, we can check the final
score of its games or the team’s overall win-loss record to
determine whether the team is actually achieving its desired
results.
Although lawyers have long used empirical research
instrumentally as another tool in their advocacy toolkit,97 for
EBP to succeed, American lawyers—who have a monopoly on
the judicial branch and dominate the executive and legislative
branches and private corporations98—must shift their
policymaking paradigm. After all, law remains the principal
tool of social and economic policy.99
EBP requires true empirical research.100 True empirical
research is not another argument that happens to use
statistics.101 EBP requires rigorously testing every factual
assumption with careful observations of the world.102 The
strongest argument in support of a particular policy is to
95. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 103.
96. See id. For a definition of “outcomes,” see supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
97. See Elizabeth Mertz, Introduction to THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
LAW i (Elizabeth Mertz ed. 2008).
98. “Although members of the legal profession constitute approximately
two-thirds of 1 percent of the working adult population in the United States,
they hold a high proportion of the positions with formal directing authority in
government relative to the members of all other occupations.” Neil Hamilton,
Ethical Leadership in Professional Life, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 358, 361 (2009).
99. See Partington, supra note 28, at 1006.
100. See supra notes 22-25, 28-30 and accompanying text. In practice,
even social science and medical academics fall short of this empirical ideal.
See Theodore Eisenberg, Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal
Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1730 n.66
(collecting authorities). But most social science and medical academics would
probably accept this ideal, at least theoretically, whereas some lawyers and
legal academics might reject it outright.
101. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2002).
102. Id. at 2-3.
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challenge that policy with the “best possible opposing
arguments.”103 Instead of cherry picking only the empirical
research that happens to agree with an arbitrary adversarial
position,104 EBP requires a sincere commitment to the
principles of “empiricism—basing conclusions on observation or
experimentation—and inference—using facts we know to learn
about facts we do not know.”105 Because of the importance of
empirical evidence, familiarity with empirical methods
sufficient to be a good consumer of empirical research is an
essential lawyering skill.106 Over the last two decades, federal
civil rulemaking has demonstrated a growing commitment to
both empiricism and inference.107

103. Id. at 10.
104. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
105. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 2 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). Epstein and King explain the disparity between the idealized EBP
paradigm of a social science PhD and the idealized adversarial paradigm of a
litigator:
While a Ph.D. is taught to subject his or her favored
hypothesis to every conceivable test and data source,
seeking out all possible evidence against his or her theory,
an attorney is taught to amass all the evidence for his or her
hypothesis and distract attention from anything that might
be seen as contradictory information. An attorney who
treats a client like a hypothesis would be disbarred; a Ph.D.
who advocates a hypothesis like a client would be ignored.
Id. at 9.
106. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 1. Such familiarity also would
make lawyers into better advocates, better able to self-diagnose the quality of
her own empirical research and to criticize the flaws of her adversary’s
empirical research.
107. Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Bryant Garth are less sanguine about
empiricism’s lasting impact upon federal civil rulemaking. In their opinion,
although past history demonstrates cycles of increasing empirical research in
rulemaking, the end result consistently has been little-to-no actual change in
the rules. Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow & Bryant G. Garth, Civil Procedure and
Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 679, 695
(Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds. 2010).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/3

22

RHEE

82

2/28/2013 9:47 PM

Final

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

II. Empirical Research of Federal Civil Rulemaking
Empirical research of federal civil rulemaking had humble
beginnings. When drafting the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the first Advisory Committee did not utilize any
empirical research. After maintaining this neglect for fifty
years, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee began
commissioning the Federal Judicial Center (the “FJC”) to
conduct empirical research of the Rules only in 1988.108
Although in 1978 Chief Justice Warren Berger commissioned a
FJC study of controlled experimentation of rules changes109
and several academics have since recommended such
experimental research,110 experimentation has yet to be
adopted in a consistent and comprehensive manner throughout
the federal courts.111 Meanwhile, both the Advisory Committee
and the legal academy have subsequently embraced empirical
research.112
108. Willging, supra note 23, at 1143 tbl.1.
109. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION
IN THE LAW, at v (1981).
110. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 683 (1998) (stating it is
“encouraging” that the advisory committee “has commissioned empirical
research in advance of possible rulemaking”); Laurens Walker, Avoiding
Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of Economic Analysis, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 572 (1994) (discussing the positive benefits of using
empirical research, but stating that existing research should be utilized due
to cost and barriers to institutional reform).
111. Although an amendment to Rule 83 allowing experimental rules
testing was proposed in 1991, it was never adopted. See Committee on Rules
of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed
Rules: Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991).
112. Not everyone agrees, however, with the objectivity of empirical
studies on civil rulemaking. For example, Menkel-Meadow and Garth have
concluded that
[E]mpirical studies of how rules actually operate have, for
the most part, been used in partisan ways to advocate for
particular reforms in the interests of one or another legal or
client constituency. . . . Only relatively rarely has empirical
study of civil procedure been conducted by more
disinterested or “neutral” social scientists and legal
scholars. . . . Indeed, . . . many of those conducting or
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A. Humble Beginnings
Several careful historical studies have extensively
examined the original intent of the Founding Fathers113 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.114 While these “lionized”115
Founding Fathers created a “Big Bang” by completely
remaking “the civil justice system in America,”116 the first rules
they created in 1938 were based upon “little empirical
evidence.”117 Empirical legal research at that time was in its
methodological infancy.118 Although Charles Clark—the
Reporter of the first Rules Advisory Committee119—did employ
empirical research to study civil procedure,120 his results were
often ignored or rejected.121 Even back then, there was a
commissioning empirical studies of civil procedural
processes have been directly involved as advocates for
particular procedural reforms.
Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 680.
113. The original Advisory Committee was composed entirely of men.
See Order, Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and
Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774, 774-75 (1935) (listing original Advisory Committee
names).
114. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1025 (1982); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and
Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
371, 371-73 (2010); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 496-98 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912-14 (1987).
115. Coquillette, supra note 51, at 685.
116. Kravitz, supra note 45, at 215.
117. Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for
Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 782 (1993).
118. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical
Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195,
196 (1980); see also Wheeler, supra note 50, at 31-33.
119. Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 85 YALE. L.J. 914, 915 (1976). Charles Clark was the Dean of
Yale Law School and a Federal Judge, sitting on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id.
120. John Henry Schlegel & David Trubek, Charles E. Clark and the
Reform of Legal Education, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 108-11
(Peninah Petruck ed. 1991); see MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 233, 312 & n.85 (1992) (describing how “one of the
earliest examples of an emerging actuarial argument” in a case was dicta).
121. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
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“tension between norm-oriented lawyers and numbercrunching social scientists.”122 Clark reportedly lamented that
all that was expected from empirical research was more
“interpretation” and fewer facts.123 Clark, however, helped
create the precursor system124 of today’s federal court
statistical data system.125
The fact that empirical research did not inform the original
1938 rules highlights the need for empirical testing of the
current rules. Although the combined experience of the First
Advisory Committee provided a form of qualitative evidence,
they do not appear to have used any methodologically rigorous,
testable empirical research.126 The original rules passed into
law automatically in 1938 without a congressional vote.127
Because of the slow, conflict-adverse nature of federal civil
rulemaking,128 many of the assumptions in the original 1938
rules remain untested in the current version of the Federal
Rules.129
Here are two examples that illustrate the problems
underlying untested assumptions. The first could be considered
pro-defendant whereas the second could be considered proplaintiff. First, Rules 1 and 81130 make clear that the rules are
SOCIAL SCIENCE 8-11, 113-14 (1995); Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and
Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the
New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 831 & n.59 [hereinafter Heise,
Past, Present, and Future]; David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L.
REV. 433, 504-05 (2010).
122. Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 685.
123. SCHLEGEL, supra note 121, at 94.
124. See Will Shafroth, Federal Judicial Statistics, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 200, 205 (1948).
125. See 28 U.S.C. §604(a)(2), (b) (2006). Current federal court statistics
are
available
online.
See
Statistics,
U.S.
CRTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
126. For a definition of empirical research, see supra note 23.
127. Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our
Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 297 (1994).
128. See Kravitz, supra note 45, at 213, 215-17.
129. See generally Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute:
Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal
Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1989) (describing the uncertainty within the
current debate over the procedure crisis).
130. FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 81.
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transsubstantive as they apply to most federal civil lawsuits
regardless of the nature of the parties or the underlying
claim.131 The original Advisory Committee adopted this onesize-fits-all premise without any debate.132 However, this
premise ignores possible power disparities in litigation.
Transsubstantivity means that a lawsuit between two
sophisticated corporations with tremendous resources (e.g., two
“Goliaths”) is treated the same as a lawsuit between an
indigent plaintiff and a defendant corporation or government
(e.g., a “David” versus a “Goliath”). Behind transsubstantivity
lies an implicit empirical assumption—that subjecting Davids
to the same rules as Goliaths will not affect the outcome. In
other words, transsubstantivity assumes that there is no need
to have different procedural rules for lawsuits between
Goliaths and lawsuits between Davids and Goliaths, because
the final disposition would be the same under either procedural
regime. Considerable empirical research casts doubt on this
assumption.133
Second, Martin Redish and Colleen McNamara have
questioned another foundational presumption of the original
rules, that discovery costs were to remain where they fell. “[A]
party required to produce discovery requested by another party
was—and to this day continues to be—assumed to bear
whatever costs it incurred in the course of that production.”134
Implicit behind this policy presumption is the empirical
assumption that this arrangement—in the words of Rule 1—is
the speediest and most inexpensive way to organize discovery
in a just manner.135 Redish and McNamara traced this
assumption back to the

131. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive
Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2010).
132. Id. at 383 (footnote omitted).
133. See, e.g., Jayanth K. Krishnan & Stewart Macaulay, Toward the
Next Generation of Galanter-Influenced Scholars: The Influential Reach of a
Law-and-Society Founder, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., at i (2008).
134. Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back To the Future:
Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 773, 774 (2011).
135. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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[I]nertia that began with the original adoption of
the Federal Rules in 1938. The drafters of the
original Federal Rules failed to seriously consider
moral, economic, or democratic first principles
when they apparently assumed, without
discussion, that producing parties, rather than
requesting parties, would bear the costs of
discovery.136
Given that practitioners and judges frequently complain
about the high discovery costs in civil litigation137 and that
discovery costs, unlike other forms of policy, are easily
quantifiable, it is remarkable that this original assumption has
not been empirically tested.138 Accordingly, the current rules
carry over empirical assumptions from the original rules that
need to be tested and verified. Fortunately, in recent years, the
federal civil rulemaking process has gradually accepted, and
even institutionalized, increased empirical research of the
rules.
B. Gradual Acceptance and Institutionalization
The two government organizations arguably most
instrumental to current empirical research of the rules are the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee and the Federal Judicial
Center.139
1. Civil Rules Advisory Committee
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee (the “Advisory
Committee”) is the modern descendant of the original Advisory
Committee.140 During the first fifty years since enacting the
136. Redish & McNamara, supra note 134, at 775.
137. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007)
(complaining of high discovery costs in federal civil litigation); INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 55, at 2.
138. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 134, at 776.
139. See Kravitz, supra note 45, at 216.
140. In 1942, the Supreme Court designated the original Advisory
Committee “a continuing Advisory Committee to advise the Court with
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Federal Civil Rules, the Advisory Committee rarely referred to
empirical research when evaluating proposed rules
amendments.141 A 1988 bibliography of empirical research in
civil procedure concluded, “little of merit was published prior to
the 1960’s.”142 Before 1988, the Advisory Committee apparently
mentioned empirical research in its notes to rules amendments
only four times.143 In 1970, the Advisory Committee cited the
field study produced by the Columbia Project for Effective
Justice in support of amendments to the federal discovery
rules.144 In 1980, the Advisory Committee cited another
empirical study in support of its amendments to Rule 26(f).145
Finally, in 1983, the Advisory Committee cited empirical
studies in support of its amendments to Rules 16146 and 26(f).147
Ironically, that same year, the Advisory Committee’s 1983
amendments to Rule 11 were criticized as not being based upon
any empirical research.148

respect to proposed amendments or additions to the Rule . . . .” Continuance
of Advisory Committee, 314 U.S. 720, 720 (1942). While the Advisory
Committee was later “discharged with thanks” in 1956, Discharge of Advisory
Committee, 352 U.S. 803, 803 (1956), the Advisory Committee became
permanent in 1958. See Act of July 11, 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356.
The annual rulemaking process is explained in 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006). See
also Announcement, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,752 (Apr. 5, 1989) (publishing
Procedures adopted by the Judicial Conference of the U.S. on Mar. 14, 1989);
Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 1655 (1995).
141. Willging, supra note 23, at 1121 (citing Rosenberg, supra note 2, at
14).
142. Michael Chiorazzi et al., Empirical Studies in Civil Procedure: A
Selected Annotated Bibliography, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 89 (1988);
see Wheeler, supra note 50, at 41-42 (for a listing of major 1960’s empirical
research in civil procedure).
143. See Willging, supra note 23, at 1121 nn.3-4.
144. Id. at 1121 n.3 (citing Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 25-27).
145. Id. at 1122 n.4 (citing PAUL CONNOLLY ET AL., JUDICIAL CONTROLS
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978)).
146. Id. at 1121 n.3 (citing STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND
COURT MANAGEMENT IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (1977)).
147. Id. at 1122 n.4 (citing CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 145).
148. Willging, supra note 23, at 1122. In fairness to the Advisory
Committee, there were not many reported Rule 11 decisions before the 1983
amendments. From 1938-1983, there were a total of 25 reported Rule 11
cases. Mark Spiegel, Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into
the Neutrality of Procedural Rules, 32 CONN. L. REV. 155, 157 (1999).
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Beginning in 1988, the Advisory Committee began asking
the Federal Judicial Center (the “FJC”) for empirical studies to
inform the Advisory Committee’s rulemaking.149 In the early
1990s, commentators increasingly criticized the Advisory
Committee’s failure to base its rulemaking upon empirical
research.150 In 1993, Stephen Burbank “lament[ed]” the
Advisory Committee’s “studied indifference to empirical
questions” and even went so far as to call for a moratorium “on
procedural law reform, whether by court rule or by statute,
until such time as we know what we are doing.”151 As a
member of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the
“JCUS”) Standing Committee observed in 1995, “[r]esponding
to recommendations from judges and scholars that ‘rules
changes be predicated on a sounder empirical basis,’ the
various rules advisory committees increased ‘their requests for
assistance from the [FJC] to conduct research on litigation
practices and the impact of the rules.’”152
In 1995, the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the
Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (the “Subcommittee”),
composed of Professor Thomas Baker and Judge Frank
Easterbrook, validated this call for increased empirical
research:
It is frequently asserted, most often by academic
critics, that federal rulemaking today is too
dependent on anecdotal information rather than
empirical research. Rules changes more often
149. McCabe, supra note 140, at 1680 (“[T]he advisory committees have
been increasing their requests for assistance from the [FJC] to conduct
research on litigation practices and the impact of the rules.”).
150. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court
Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 335 (1991); Coquillette,
supra note 51, at 713-15; Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural
Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 841 (1993); A.
Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1585–94 (1991); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience:
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 795, 810 (1991); Walker, supra note 110, at 572.
151. Burbank, supra note 150, at 841-42.
152. Willging, supra note 23, at 1141 (citing McCabe, supra note 140, at
1680).
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than not depend on the legal research of the
Reporters combined with the informed judgment
of the members of the rules committees. To make
this argument is not necessarily to find fault
with the model of disinterested experts as
rulemakers. Nor does the argument deny the
not-infrequent, well-documented instances when
rulemakers have relied on empirical research.
Yet not enough has been done to incorporate
empirical research into rulemaking on a regular
basis.153
The Subcommittee encouraged the FJC to “engage in
original rules-related empirical research to determine how
procedures are working.”154 Finally, the Subcommittee
recommended that the Advisory Committee “rely to the
maximum possible extent on empirical data as a basis for
proposing rules changes”155 and concluded that “[e]ach
Advisory Committee should ground its proposals on available
data and develop mechanisms for gathering and evaluating
data that are not otherwise available, and should use these
data to decide whether changes in existing rules should be
proposed.”156
Given such recommendations, the Advisory Committee not
surprisingly increasingly referred to empirical research during
its rulemaking deliberations. In 1995, in response to a 1994
FJC random survey of 150 federal judges on attorney voir
dire,157 the Advisory Committee expressed openness to
experimental testing of Rule 47(a),158 stating that there “may
be some room for systematic experimentation to test the
information provided by the FJC survey of federal judges.”159
153. Coquillette, supra note 51, at 699 (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Willging, supra note 23, at 1143 tbl.1.
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a).
159. Willging, supra note 23, at 1165 (quoting Minutes, Civ. Rules
Advisory Comm., Rule 47(a) (Edward H. Cooper, Reporter, Apr. 18-19, 1996),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/cv4-
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Starting in 2004, the Advisory Committee referred more
frequently to empirical research in its Committee minutes.
In 2004, the Advisory Committee reviewed a FJC empirical
study of sealed settlement agreements filed in federal courts. 160
In addition, the Advisory Committee mentioned that the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (the
“AOUSC”) was conducting informal empirical research on Rule
29.161 In 2005, the Advisory Committee reviewed a FJC
empirical study on hung juries.162 In 2011, the Advisory
Committee mentioned that many organizations other than the
FJC “are pursuing empirical work that should shed further
light, not only on the experience in litigation but on the allimportant questions of pre-litigation behavior.”163
In 2010, the Advisory Committee observed that “[s]ome of
the same information-technology changes that gave rise to
electronic discovery also provided the promise of improved
access to empirical information about the costs and burdens
imposed in civil lawsuits in federal courts”164 and mentioned a
FJC study of “federal civil cases that terminated in the last
quarter of 2008.”165 To address conflicting empirical data
claiming that federal civil lawsuits either suffer from “undue
and rising cost and delay” or are “handled relatively quickly
and efficiently,”166 the Advisory Committee invited more than
1896.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
160. Minutes, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 43-44 (Edward H. Cooper,
Reporter,
Apr.
15-16,
2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CRAC0404
.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
161. Report of the Judicial Conference, Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Proc.
6-7
(David
F.
Levy
et
al.,
Reporters,
Mar.
2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST32004.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
162. Minutes, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 19-20 (Edward H. Cooper,
Reporter,
Oct.
27-28,
2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV112005-min.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
163. Report to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 99 (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV122010.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
164. Id. at 189.
165. Id.
166. Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice
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seventy people to a Litigation Review Conference in May
2010.167 The Advisory Committee intended to focus Part I of the
Conference on empirical research as “a cornerstone.”168
Prominently discussed at the Conference was a practitioner
opinion survey concerning whether the civil rules were
“conducive to meeting the Rule 1 goals of just, speedy, and
inexpensive” litigation.169 The Advisory Committee also noted
that a “great amount of empirical data was assembled in
preparation” for this Conference and that the “rich and detailed
data generated by all this work provided an important anchor
for Conference discussion and will be a basis for further
assessment of the federal civil justice system for years to
come.”170
In 2011, the Advisory Committee referred to an FJC study
concerning the frequency of spoliation motions in federal court
and recommended more “pilot projects testing new procedures”
to “provide fertile sources of information for considering future
rules amendments.”171 Such pilot programs “work best,”
observed the Advisory Committee, “when they are framed from
the beginning in ways that will enable the [FJC] to provide
rigorous evaluation of the results.”172 With regard to a motion
and
Procedure
18
(Sept.
2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST092010.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
167. Id.
168. Minutes, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 30 (Edward H. Cooper,
Reporter,
Apr.
20-21,
2009),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV042009-min.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
169. Minutes, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 7 (Edward H. Cooper,
Reporter,
Mar.
18-19,
2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV032010-min.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
170. Report to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 189 (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV122010.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
171. Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell to Hon. Mark R.
Kravitz Regarding the Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 7 (Dec.
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV122011.pdf.
172. Minutes, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 4 (Edward H. Cooper,
Reporter, Nov. 7-8, 2011) [hereinafter Nov. 7-8 Advisory Committee
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to dismiss study, both authors of the original FJC study173 and
the law professor critique174 addressed the Advisory
Committee.175 The Advisory Committee also mentioned four
other motion to dismiss empirical studies176 and reviewed the
preliminary results of a Rule 16(b) survey.177
The FJC’s chief empiricist to the Advisory Committee
concluded in 2002 that the Advisory Committee “has
established a pattern of continuing consultation with the FJC
and other empirical researchers about empirical questions.
Such consultations occur before the Advisory Committee
proposes rules changes, while it reviews and hears comments
on proposals that have been made, and while it deliberates
about those proposals.”178 Many of the empirical studies upon
which the Advisory Committee has relied on were completed by
the FJC.179
2. Federal Judicial Center
Congress created the FJC in 1967.180 Chief Justice Earl
Warren, who chaired the Warren Commission investigating
President Kennedy’s assassination,181 used his personal
influence with President Lyndon Johnson to have the FJC’s
appropriation placed in a crime control bill.182 The authorizing
Minutes],
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV112011-min.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
173. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
174. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
175. Nov. 7-8 Advisory Committee Minutes, supra note 172, at 53.
176. Report to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Civ. Rules Advisory Committee 226-28 (May 2, 2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV052011.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
177. Id. at 275.
178. Willging, supra note 23, at 1141-42 (footnote omitted).
179. See id.
180. Wheeler, supra note 50, at 38-41.
181. Id. at 40.
182. Id.; see also Landmark Judicial Legislation: Establishment of the
Federal
Judicial
Center,
FED.
JUD.
CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_18.html (last visited Oct.
27, 2012).
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legislation stated that the FJC “will enable the courts to begin
the kind of self-analysis, research and planning necessary for a
more effective judicial system.”183
The FJC’s statutory mission is “to conduct research and
study of the operation of the courts of the United States, and to
stimulate and coordinate such research and study on the part
of other public and private persons and agencies.”184 To
maintain the integrity of its research, the FJC, while
considered part of the judicial branch, is organizationally
independent from the AOUSC185 and the rest of the judicial
branch.186 As the Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Ad Hoc Committee
observed, “[i]n matters relating to research and the formulation
of conclusions, the FJC should have complete independence to
explore ideas and proposals and to make evaluations, whether
or not their findings comport generally with the findings of the”
AOUSC.187 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that both the
FJC and the AOUSC were “separate but mutually reinforcing
support agencies . . . provid[ing] the courts and the [JCUS]
complementary services and, on occasional major matters of
policy, diverse perspectives that benefit the decision-making
process.”188 The FJC has occasionally disagreed with the
JCUS’s policy recommendations.189 The FJC’s “independence,
183. Wheeler, supra note 50, at 39 & n.52 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
184. 28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(l) (2006). See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
185. Wheeler, supra note 50, at 50-51.
186. Although the FJC is “governed by judges,” it remains “independent
within the judicial branch.” Schwarzer, supra note 50, at 1134. The FJC is a
“separate agency ‘within the judicial branch,’ rather than as part of or
reporting to another component of the judiciary.” Id. at 1135 (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 620(a) (2006)). Although the FJC’s Board is composed of federal
judges (and the AOUSC’s Director ex officio), judges are forbidden from
serving on both the FJC’s Board and the Judicial Conference at the same
time. 28 U.S.C. § 621 (2006). The Board also appoints the FJC’s Director. 28
U.S.C. § 623 (2006).
187. Schwarzer, supra note 50, at 1141 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
188. William H. Rehnquist, 1992 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, reprinted in 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 609, 615 (1993).
189. For example, the FJC at least twice has recommended continuing
pilot programs over the Judicial Conference’s objection. See Schwarzer, supra
note 50, at 1141-42.
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the value of which is generally accepted, is tempered, however,
by the necessity of maintaining a productive working
relationship with the [Judicial] Conference and its
committees.”190
Because of the AOUSC’s statutory responsibility to collect
“statistical data and reports as to the business of the courts,”191
however, the FJC works closely with the AOUSC. Much like
the legislative branch’s Congressional Research Service192 or
Government Accountability Office,193 the judicial branch’s FJC
enjoys a credible nonpartisan reputation of professional
independence.194 Much of the FJC’s research is empirical
research commissioned by the Advisory Committee, the JCUS,
or Congress.195 Since 1988, the FJC has completed many
empirical studies at the Advisory Committee’s request
concerning Rules 1, 11, 12, 16, 23, 26, 26-37, 47, 53, 56, 58, and
68.196
Although it is the official research arm of the federal
judiciary, the FJC of course is not the only game in town. The
FJC’s empirical research interacts with other public and
private research. In fact, there is a “small industry” of
empirical researchers “oriented toward the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in the United States and measurement and
comparison of the efficiency of rules and processes outside of
the United States.”197 For example, Professor Lonny Hoffman

190. Id. at 1140.
191. 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2) (2006). Scholars have criticized the reliability
of the AOUSC’s data. See infra note 442 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional
Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1316-17 (2001).
193. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Response, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L.
REV. SEE ALSO 1, 6 (2010).
194. See Wheeler, supra note 50, at 51 & n.142 (citing Gordon Bermant
& Russell Wheeler, From Within the System: Educational and Research
Programs at the Federal Judicial Center, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF
CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 102, 143 (Gary B. Melton ed. 1987)) (the FJC
now has nearly one hundred personnel positions and a low turnover rate).
195. See generally Wheeler, supra note 50, at 41 & n.72 (describing the
“research function” of the FJC).
196. See Willging, supra note 23, at 1143 tbl.1; see also supra notes 14878.
197. Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 695.
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criticized198 the FJC’s recent empirical study199 of federal civil
pleading in response to the Supreme Court’s seminal decisions
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly200 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.201
Hoffman’s empirical critique reflects the increasing popularity
of empirical research in the legal academy.
C. The New Legal Realist Study of Civil Litigation
In addition to the Advisory Committee’s increasing desire
to base its rulemaking upon empirical evidence202 and the
FJC’s increasing expertise in empirical research,203 another
reason why the present time is ideal for evidence-based federal
civil rulemaking is the current renaissance of the empirical
study of law in the legal academy. “For the first time in at least
a generation, serious empirical research appears to be taking
root and blossoming within the legal academy.”204
Commentators have bestowed loosely defined labels such as
Empirical Legal Studies (“ELS”) and New Legal Realism
(“NLR”) on this scholarly movement.205 Although the original
legal realists206 long ago advocated the use of empirical
methods to study law,207 a perfect storm of an increasing
198. See generally Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An
Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011).
199. Joe Cecil, et al., Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim after
Iqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 10 & tbl.2, 21 (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf.
200. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
201. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
202. See supra Part II.B.1 for further discussion.
203. See supra Part II.B.2 for further discussion.
204. Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal
Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 555, 556 (2010).
205. Id; see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal
Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834–35 (2008).
206. “[L]egal realism” is a loose label for “legal commentators, primarily
from the 1930s and 1940s,” who sought to enable “citizens, lawyers, and
judges to understand what was really going on behind the jargon and
mystification of the law.” BIX, supra note 56, at 3 (emphasis in original).
207. The celebrated American jurist Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
himself wrote in 1897, “[f]or the rational study of the law . . . the man of the
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number of empirically trained Ph.D.s entering the legal
academy,208 the easy availability of powerful statistical
software programs that run on a personal computer,209 the
proliferation of educational empirical legal resources,210 and
the increasing prestige of empirical legal scholarship in the
legal academy211 joined to contribute to the emergence of NLR.
Like the legal realist empiricists before them, these New
Legal Realists share “a desire to inject serious empirical
inquiry into legal and policy debates.”212 “Law and” social
scientists, of course, have long employed empirical techniques
to study law.213 In the civil litigation context, political scientists
have used empirical research to study judicial decisionmaking,214 social psychologists have used empirical research to
study procedural justice,215 and the Law and Society Movement
has “sought to promote dialog between empirical social science
and law.”216 Like Law and Society, NLR “embraces a groundlevel up perspective that draws attention to the effect of law on
the everyday lives of ordinary people—in addition to the

future is the man of statistics.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law,
78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 708 (1998); see also, e.g., SCHLEGEL, supra note 121, at 811, 113-14; Heise, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 121, at 823; Herbert
M. Kritzer, Empirical Legal Studies Before 1940: A Bibliographic Essay, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 925, 926 (2009).
208. Michael Heise, Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship
Production, 1990-2009, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1739, 1747-48 n.22 [hereinafter
Heise, Empirical Analysis].
209. See, e.g., LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 171.
210. For example, the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies has
become “perhaps the largest annual refereed academic legal conference in the
world.” Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 1713. There is an Oxford Handbook of
Empirical Research and a law school casebook. Id. at 1714. Centers for
empirical legal research have been established at the University of
California, Los Angeles, Cornell, Washington University, Harvard, and
Berkeley. Id.
211. See Heise, Empirical Analysis, supra note 208, at 1741.
212. Suchman & Mertz, supra note 204, at 557.
213. Id. at 556.
214. See, e.g., id. at 559; see also Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky & Jonathan L.
Williams, Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1174 (2009).
215. See, e.g., Suchman & Mertz, supra note 204, at 559; see also
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the
Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 138 (2011).
216. Suchman & Mertz, supra note 204, at 567.
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experiences of elites and professionals.”217 Social scientists
understandably might ask, why all the fuss now? We’ve been
here the whole time.
The difference is that this empiricism is centered within
the legal academy itself.218 By seeking “to legitimate empirical
research within the legal academy itself,”219 ELS and NLR may
facilitate greater use of and respect for empiricism in the
general legal profession.220 The vast majority of American
lawyers and judges must spend three years in law school before
becoming a member of the Bar.221 While there remains
grumbling over the relationship between the legal academy
and the practicing Bar,222 because of this training pipeline
connection, unlike outside researchers from other “law and”
disciplines,223 legal academics and legal practitioners are
considered part of the same legal profession.224 Consequently,
“legal scholarship—perhaps to a greater degree and more
immediately than most other research—has the potential to
influence public policy as it is promulgated by judges,
legislators, and bureaucrats.”225

217. Id. at 561.
218. Id. at 556; see also Karen Sloan, Empiricism Divides the Academy:
Upstart Number-Crunchers Attract Praise and Derision, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 28,
2011, at A1.
219. Suchman & Mertz, supra note 204, at 556.
220. Accord Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 1728-29 (stating that ELS has
helped law professors not trained in other “law and” disciplines recognize
that the “empirical study of law is a tool that might be considered for use by
any legal scholar when an empirical issue is of interest”).
221. See, e.g., Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Application of Enactment, Implementation, or Repeal of Formal
Educational Requirement for Admission to the Bar, 44 A.L.R.4th 910, § 2
(1986).
222. See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice:
Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and
Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal
Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105 (2010).
223. See, e.g., STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL
READER (2007).
224. Cf. Richard Brust, The High Bench vs. the Ivory Tower, A.B.A. J.,
Feb.
1,
2012,
at
50,
available
at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_high_bench_vs._the_ivory_t
ower/ (discussing the use of legal scholarship).
225. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 7 & n.20 (collecting authorities).
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Although ELS, NLR, and the “Law ands”226 share a
synergistic relationship with EBP, the point of EBP is “not to
produce a set of empirical term papers that we academics can
present to each other at conferences. The point is to create
better law—law informed by reality.”227 As Maurice Rosenberg
commented, EBP research is not as obsessed with revisionist
originality as traditional academic research “and is willing to
work three years without necessarily turning up a tremendous
new discovery, but just adding one more brick to the edifice of
knowledge.”228 In response, empirical academics might warn
would-be evidence-based policymakers of the “pull of the policy
audience,”229 where hyper-focus on current policy relevance can
subtly yet dangerously cloud research objectivity.230 This is not
to say that pure research is not useful. It clearly is. By virtue of
academic freedom, there must always be pure research.231 But,
EBP unapologetically seeks to apply research to real-world
problems.
Fortunately for EBP, academic empiricists can provide not
only another rich (and perhaps more independent) source of
relevant empirical research but also a check on the FJC,
RAND,232
and
other
more
explicitly
policy-focused
233
institutions.
Whether to produce academic term papers or
226. See Marc Galanter & Mark Alan Edwards, Introduction: The Path
of the Law Ands, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 375, 376.
227. Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 910.
228. Schwarzer, supra note 50, at 1159 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
229. Suchman & Mertz, supra note 204, at 575 (quoting Austin Sarat &
Susan Sibley, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 L. & POL’Y 97, 97 (1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
230. Id. at 575-76.
231. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 50, at 1158.
232. The RAND Institute for Civil Justice has conducted considerable
private and government-funded empirical research of the federal courts. For
example, Congress and the AOUSC commissioned RAND to evaluate the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. See JAMES KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY,
AND INEXPENSIVE?: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996).
233. For example, consider the recent academic critique of the FJC’s
Twombly/Iqbal pleading study. Compare Cecil et al., supra note 199, and
Hoffman, supra note 198. There is an all-your-eggs-in-one-basket “danger of
an over-reliance on a single government-controlled source of research
evidence.” Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice
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reality-based policy, all empirical research shares a basic
common methodology. In the civil litigation arena, such
methodology includes the challenge of coding cases to make
them empirically useful.
III. The Challenge of Case Coding
Mark Twain may have quipped: “Facts are stubborn
things, but statistics are more pliable.”234 For EBP to work, it
must have access to relevant, representative, and reliable
empirical data.235 Because empirical research—like all
research—can be manipulated,236 policymakers need to be good
consumers of empirical research.237 The representativeness and
reliability of EBP depends upon the quality of the input
evidence. Garbage in, garbage out.238 To be useful for EBP, an
empirical study thus must utilize a rigorous, sound research
methodology.
Generally, the methodology for all empirical research has
four steps: (1) design the empirical project; (2) collect and code
data; (3) analyze the data; and (4) present the final results.239
This Part focuses upon the second step, data coding. All raw
data—from a pile of pleadings to electronic docket entries in a
court database—need to be analyzed and labeled before they

in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 8. Insider policy
researchers might suffer from a myopic “preoccupation with research geared
simply to fulfilling established and unquestioned policy objectives.” Francis
Terry, Transport: Beyond Predict and Provide, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note
18, at 200. The more an academic researcher becomes a government insider,
the greater the “pull of the policy audience” to compromise objectivity. See
supra note 228 and accompanying text.
234. AYRES, supra note 34, at 79 (quoted with no citation).
235. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., JOEL BEST, STAT-SPOTTING: A FIELD GUIDE TO INDENTIFYING
DUBIOUS DATA (2008); HANS ZEISEL & DAVID KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES:
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW AND LITIGATION (1997); Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using Empirical Research in Law
and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777 (2002).
237. Accord LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 1.
238. See supra notes 37-40, 88-90 and accompanying text.
239. Epstein & Martin, Quantitative Approaches, supra note 30, at 904.
There are of course other formulations of these steps but they all share the
same basic substance. See, e.g., LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 395-96.
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can be useful. Whether qualitative,240 quantitative,241
experimental,242 or multi-method,243 all empirical research
must code raw data into standardized variables that can be
analyzed.244
Although the best empirical design begins with a research
question to guide data collection,245 in light of the expense of
collecting and coding data, “so-called ‘multi-user’ datasets,
designed for a wide-range of problems,”246 are worthy empirical
projects. Using such multi-user datasets is often called
“archival research,” because it “involves the use of data that
have been stored (or archived) in some form,”247 or “secondary
data-analysis,” because someone else initially collected and
coded the primary data.248
Such datasets, however, “are like the apple in the Garden
of Eden: tempting but full of danger.”249 Although multi-user
datasets “constitute a rich lode of materials on which many
substantial analyses can be performed,”250 they “cannot be
plucked mechanically from their source and entered into an
analysis. Without exception, all published statistics should be
treated with suspicion.”251 The key to using a preexisting,
publicly available dataset is ensuring that it provides the
correct data necessary to answer one’s research question. One’s
240. See BRYMAN, supra note 23, at 19-20.
241. Id.
242. See generally BORUCH, supra note 30.
243. “Multi-method” empirical research “uses more than one research
technique or strategy to study one or several closely related phenomena.”
Laura Beth Nielsen, The Need for Multi-Method Approaches in Empirical
Legal Research in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 953
(Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer, eds. 2010). For example, the Civil Litigation
Research Project (“CLRP”) employed both qualitative and quantitative
empirical research methods to explore “how many people used the [legal]
system and why.” Id. at 956-57 (collecting authorities).
244. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 166 (citing EARL R. BABBIE, THE
PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 325 (11th ed. 2006)); Epstein & Martin,
Coding Variables, supra note 5, at 321.
245. Epstein & Martin, Quantitative Approaches, supra note 30, at 905.
246. Id. at 909.
247. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 125.
248. Id. at 128-29.
249. HERBERT JACOB, USING PUBLISHED DATA 9 (1984).
250. Id. at 50.
251. Id. at 50-51.

41

RHEE

Final

2/28/2013 9:47 PM

2013] EVIDENCE-BASED FED. CIVIL RULEMAKING

101

research question should always drive the dataset and not vice
versa.252
Consequently, a multi-user dataset may suffer from two
research shortcomings. First, it may have selective deposit,
where it lacks “data on all of the variables in which the
researcher might be interested and that might influence the
relationships under investigation.”253 Second, its data might
suffer from selective survival, where either “not all possible
data were recorded” or “decisions about the maintenance of the
data may mean that some data are retained and other data
discarded.”254 When evaluating a multi-user dataset for EBP, a
researcher thus must ask: “Who collected it and for what
purpose? What procedures were used for collecting the data?
How were variables defined? What categories or classifications
were used? At what level of aggregation were the data
collected? . . . What documentation is available?”255
There are many examples of such multi-user datasets in
the federal government256 and the academy.257 Such public
252. For example, Brian Leiter has criticized too much ELS work as
[D]riven by the existence of a data set, rather than an
intellectual or analytical point. But the existence of a data
set then permits a display of technical skills, which is
satisfying to those with a technical fetish. But for everyone
else, the question remains: why does this matter? why
should one care? and so on.
Brian Leiter, On So Called “Empirical Legal Studies” and Its Problems,
BRIAN
LEITER’S
L.
SCH.
REP.
(July
6,
2010),
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/07/on-socalled-empirical-legalstudies.html.
253. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 126-27.
254. Id. at 127.
255. Id. at 131.
256. The best starting point for U.S. federal statistics is the Statistical
Abstract of the United States. What is the Statistical Abstract?, UNITED
STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ (last
visited Dec. 21, 2012).
257. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court Database (often called
“Spaeth’s Database” after the principal investigator) has “not just helped fill
gaps in our knowledge. It is one of those rare creatures in the law and social
science world: an invention that has substantially advanced a large area of
study, inspiring research by scholars hailing from no fewer than three and as
many as seven disciplines.” The Genesis of the Database, THE SUPREME COURT
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data-sharing has many benefits, which include: (1) reinforcing
“open scientific inquiry” that allows subsequent studies on the
same data to correct any errors in previous studies; (2)
encouraging a “diversity of analysis and opinions” where
“[r]esearchers having access to the same data can challenge
each other’s analyses and conclusions”; (3) promoting new
research and allowing for the testing of new or alternative
methods, even using the data “in ways that the original
investigators had not envisioned”; (4) improving data collection
and measurement methods through peer review; (5) promoting
methodological consensus over publicly available data; and (6)
“[r]educ[ing] costs by avoiding duplicate data collection
efforts.”258
Because this Article’s thesis is to create a new multi-user
dataset of federal court outcomes,259 the more cases that can be
coded and added to the dataset the better for two reasons.
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/about.php (last visited Dec. 21,
2012). A similar database exists for the U.S. Court of Appeals. U.S. Appeals
Courts
Database,
THE
JUDICIAL
RESEARCH
INITIATIVE,
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2012) (often
called the “Songer Database”).
There are many more academic multi-user datasets available. Two
comprehensive portals to multiple publicly available datasets are maintained
by ICPSR and IQSS. The University of Michigan Inter-University
Consortium For Political and Social Research (“ICPSR”) “maintains a data
archive of more than 500,000 files of research in the social sciences.” About
ICPSR,
ICPSR,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/membership/about.html
(last
visited Dec. 21, 2012). The Harvard University Institute for Quantitative
Social Science (“IQSS”) Dataverse Network “is an open source application to
publish, share, reference, extract and analyze research data. It facilitates
making data available to others, and allows to replicate others work.” About
the Project, THE DATAVERSE NETWORK PROJECT, http://thedata.org/book/aboutproject (last visited Dec. 21, 2012). The actual Network is located at
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/.
258. INTERUNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, GUIDE TO
SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA PREPARATION AND ARCHIVING: BEST PRACTICE
THROUGHOUT THE DATA LIFE CYCLE V (3rd ed. 2005) (citing Stephen Feinberg,
Sharing Statistical Data in the Biomedical and Health Sciences: Ethical,
Institutional, Legal, and Professional Dimensions, 15 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH
1
(1994)),
available
at,
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/61289/1/ICPSR_dataprep_pd
f (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
259. For further discussion of outcome-based research, see infra notes
367-73 and accompanying text.
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First, “as a general rule, researchers should collect as much
data as resources and time allow because basing inferences on
more data rather than less is almost always preferable.”260
Second, because a multi-user dataset is intended for multiple
users and is not custom-tailored to a specific research
question,261 the more data, the less the likelihood of selective
deposit262 or selective survival.263
This Part focuses upon coding CM/ECF outcomes into the
Federal Courts CM/ECF Descriptive Dataset (“FCCEDD”).
Although the CM/ECF system has revolutionized online access
to the federal courts, the present system is not conducive to
efficient empirical research. Specifically, coding CM/ECF cases
currently is cumbersome and expensive. Contemporaneous
coding promises to code many more cases at minimal cost.
A. The Electronic Case Filing Revolution
Given the prevalence of internet access among American
lawyers,264 it is not surprising that the federal courts allow
attorneys and pro se litigants265 to file and receive official
documents in ongoing federal civil litigation online via the
internet and electronic mail. Rule 5(d)(3) states that a federal
court “may, by local rule, allow papers to be filed, signed, or
verified by electronic means that are consistent with any

260. Epstein & Martin, Quantitative Approaches, supra note 30, at 910.
261. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
264. For example, virtually all American lawyers the ABA surveyed in
2011 had access to the internet. See 1 AM. BAR ASS’N, 2011 LEGAL
TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT xvi-xvii, 35 (2011).
265. For a discussion of how pro se litigants have less access to the
internet than lawyers, see, for example, Donald E. Shelton, All Aboard?
Electric Filing, the Digital Divide, and Access to Courts, 40 JUDGES’ J., no. 3,
2001 at 31. The AOUSC recently admitted that very few pro se litigants use
CM/ECF. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2012
UPDATE 5 (2011) [hereinafter AOUSC, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY],
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/2012ITLongRa
ngePlan.pdf.
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technical standards established by the [JCUS].”266 The JCUS
established those technical standards in its CM/ECF project.267
CM/ECF has “revolutionized the way in which the federal
courts manage their cases and documents. This easy-to-use
system allows attorneys to file documents directly with the
court over the [i]nternet and allows courts to file, store, and
manage their case files in an easy-to-access, transparent
way.”268
Today, CM/ECF contains the filed documents for forty-one
million federal cases.269 More than 600,000 federal court
attorneys and pro se litigants have filed documents in
CM/ECF.270 Most federal bankruptcy courts, district courts,
and appellate courts operate CM/ECF via their respective court
webpages.271 The CM/ECF project began in 1989 as the Public
Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) program.272
PACER has 1.2 million registered users273 who can access court
documents and information online but cannot file or respond to
lawsuits. In response to the evolution of PACER into an online
electronic case docket, in 1998 the AOUSC began developing
266. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3).
267. About
CM/ECF,
ADMIN.
OFF.
OF
U.S.
CTS.,
www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/CMECF/AboutCMECF.aspx (last visited
Dec. 22, 2012) [hereinafter About CM/ECF].
268. Id.
269. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF:
ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS GROUP FINAL REPORT 1 (2012)
[hereinafter AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF].
270. Id.
271. For a current list of federal district courts utilizing the CM/ECF
system, see Courts Accepting Electronic Filings, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/CMECF/Courts.aspx (last visited Dec.
22, 2012).
272. See Chronology of the Federal Judiciary’s Electronic Public Access
(“EPA”)
Program,
PUB.
ACCESS
CT.
ELECTRONIC
RECS.,
http://www.pacer.gov/documents/epachron.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2012).
The terms PACER and CM/ECF are used almost interchangeably.
Technically, a non-lawyer can access PACER to obtain copies of federal civil
litigation documents without interacting with CM/ECF whereas only lawyers
or pro se litigants can access CM/ECF to file and receive litigation filings. See
CM/ECF Registration, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR THE DISTRICT OF N.M.,
http://www.nmcourt.fed.us/web/DCDOCS/cmecf/registration.html (last visited
Dec. 22, 2012).
273. AOUSC, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 265, at 2.
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CM/ECF.274 In 2006, Rule 5(d)(3) was amended so that a “local
rule may require electronic filing only if reasonable exceptions
are allowed.”275 However, Rule 5(d)(3) “does not define the
scope of those exceptions.”276 The amendment “acknowledge[d]
that many courts have required electronic filing by means of a
standing order, procedures manual, or local rule.”277 Most
federal courts require that attorneys initially register to use
CM/ECF to submit and receive filings in any federal civil case
and that once initially registered, attorneys must continue to
use CM/ECF in all subsequent cases in front of that particular
court.278 Rule 5.2 requires electronic filers to redact confidential
personal information from electronically filed documents.279
Although functionally CM/ECF is just an online electronic
version of the traditional paper and “snail mail” filing system it
replaced,280 what makes electronic case filing revolutionary is
not only its increased convenience and broader public access,281
but also its potential for empirical research. The AOUSC
recognizes that “information technology presents opportunities
not simply to replicate old paper processes in digital form but
to rethink many aspects of those processes altogether.”282 In
general, recent innovations in information access, information
management, and data storage have provided the technological
274. Chronology of the Federal Judiciary’s Electronic Public Access
(“EPA”) Program, supra note 272.
275. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3).
276. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3) advisory committee’s note (2006
Amendment).
277. Id.
278. 1 MARY SQUIERS, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 5.04(2)(c)(i)
(2012).
279. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a); see also About CM/ECF, supra note 267.
280. See Looking for the Next Generation of the CM/ECF System, ADMIN.
OFF. U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/09-0501/Looking_for_the_Next_Generation_of_the_CM_ECF_System.aspx
(last
visited Dec. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Looking for the Next Generation of the
CM/ECF System]. Indeed, Rule 5(d)(3) recognizes that a “paper filed
electronically in compliance with a local rule is a written paper for purposes
of these rules.” FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3).
281. See generally PUB. ACCESS COURT ELEC. RECORDS, PACER USER
MANUAL
FOR
ECF
COURTS
1
(2012),
available
at
http://www.pacer.gov/documents/pacermanual.pdf.
282. AOUSC, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 265, at 1.
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capability necessary for data-driven decision making.283
Specifically, the CM/ECF web interface is menu-driven and
requires electronic filers to code variables284 with basic
information about the court filing before it is submitted
online.285 The filer is required to label the uploaded electronic
files containing the Adobe portable document format (“PDF”)
images286 of the paper court documents with values for simple
variables.287 This way an original source document is directly
associated with its coded values.
For example, if a registered plaintiff’s attorney wants to
file a motion for a preliminary injunction,288 she must code the
PDFs of the paper motion, memorandum in support, certificate
of service, and other attachments289 contemporaneously with
electronic filing.290 The filing then is coded by the type of case
283. See AYRES, supra note 34, at 154-55; Huw Davies et al., Introducing
Evidence-Based Policy and Practice in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?,
supra note 18, at 2.
284. Accord LoPucki, supra note 16, at 484; see also supra notes 3 and
235 and accompanying text.
285. See CM/ECF Attorney’s User Guide Chapter 7, U.S. DISTRICT CT.
FOR
THE
N.
DISTRICT
OF
FLA.,
http://www.flnd.uscourts.gov/attorneys/cmecf/User_Manual/Ch7_Filing_Docs
_in_CV_Cases.pdf (last updated July 13, 2009).
286. About CM/ECF, supra note 267.
287. Current variables include
[a] listing of all parties and participants including judges,
attorneys and trustees[;] [a] compilation of case related
information such as cause of action, nature of suit and
dollar demand[;] [a] chronology of dates of case events
entered in the case record[;] [a] claims registry[;] [a] listing
of new cases each day in all courts[; and] [j]udgments or
case status.
Frequently Asked Questions, PUB. ACCESS CT. ELECTRONIC RECS.,
http://www.pacer.gov/psc/faq.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2012) (click “PACER”
tab; then click “Case Related” tab; then click “What information is available
on PACER?”).
288. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a).
289. CM/ECF Attorney’s User’s Guide Chapter 7, supra note 285, at 2-10
(explaining how to code a motion for preliminary injunction).
290. A CM/ECF electronic filing is considered filed at the time listed in
the Notice of Electronic Filing (“NEF”) automatically generated and e-mailed
to the filer’s registered e-mail address once CM/ECF receives the filing. Id. at
19.
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(civil), type of document to be filed (motion), motion type
(preliminary injunction), case number, party/parties filing the
document, filing attorney, and name(s) of attachment(s).291
Although currently the required information is rather
basic—generally the information included in a standard case
docket sheet—the coding is completed by the certifying
attorney of record responsible for the court filing under Rule
11(a).292 Under Rule 11, the filing attorney thus certifies the
accuracy of her coding under penalty of sanctions.293 CM/ECF
automatically electronically mails the filing—and associated
coding—to the court, the clerk, and all other counsel of record,
including opposing counsel.294
Accordingly, three unique facts increase the likelihood of
CM/ECF’s coding accuracy. First, the filing is coded
contemporaneously with the formal submission of the filing
when the coder’s knowledge of the filing is the clearest. Second,
the coder is the attorney or pro se party with firsthand
knowledge of the filing. Finally, the coding is reviewed by both
opposing counsel and the court under penalty of Rule 11
sanctions.
At present, the AOUSC and the FJC295 are designing the
“Next Generation of CM/ECF.”296 In 2008, the AOUSC
appointed a steering group for the CM/ECF Next Generation
(“Next Generation”) Project “to develop and prioritize system

291. Id. at 2-10.
292. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a), (b). The registered attorney’s (or pro se
litigant’s) CM/ECF username and password is needed to access the system
serve as the registered filer’s signature. MICHAEL SMITH, O’CONNOR’S FEDERAL
RULES: CIVIL TRIALS 21 (2012) (citing D. AZ. LOC. R. 5.5(g)); U.S. DIST. COURT
FOR THE S. DIST. OF CAL., ELECTRONIC CASE FILING ADMINISTRATION POLICIES &
PROCEDURES
MANUAL
11
(2012),
available
at
http://www.casd.uscourts.gov/cmecf/pdf/CASDPolicies.pdf.
293. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a), (b).
294. CM/ECF Attorney’s User’s Guide Chapter 7, supra note 285, at 1920.
295. Although the FJC retains “evaluat[ion of] emerging technologies . . .
for their application to future needs of the Judiciary[,]” the FJC transferred
“all development, implementation, and evaluation of court automation
systems and supporting technologies” to the AOUSC in 1990. Schwarzer,
supra note 50, at 1145-46 (citing Memorandum to the Chief Justice (Jan. 29,
1992) (on file with the Federal Judicial Center)).
296. AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at 1.
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requirements for a new application.”297 The question they seek
to answer is: “If we could change CM/ECF in any way, what
would we want the Next Generation system to look like?”298 In
2009, the AOUSC also appointed an Additional Stakeholders
Functional Requirements Group (the “ASFRG”) to canvass
selected users of CM/ECF outside the federal judiciary.299
Professor Ted Eisenberg, editor of the Journal of Empirical
Legal Studies,300 represented the Association of American Law
Schools on the ASFRG.301 The ASFRG completed its final
report on February 27, 2012.302 This requirements-phase
appears complete and “will be followed by design, coding,
testing, and implementation phases.”303
To facilitate empirical research and EBP fully, the Next
Generation system design should include the automated ability
to: (1) search the full-text of all available CM/ECF information
with keywords (to include docket coding and the text of filed
documents); (2) download relevant CM/ECF documents
automatically; (3) import data from downloaded documents
automatically into computer software used for empirical
analysis; and (4) update the data from previous CM/ECF
searches automatically.304
The first and second design features are interrelated. The
ability to keyword search all CM/ECF information would allow
researchers to identify which documents to download
automatically. Internal CM/ECF court users apparently

297. Id.
298. Looking for the Next Generation of the CM/ECF System, supra note
280 (internal quotation marks omitted).
299. AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at i.
300. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, WILEY ONLINE LIBR.,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1740-1461 (last visited
Dec. 22, 2012).
301. AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at 2.
302. Id. at i.
303. ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR,
ADMIN.
OFF.
U.S.
CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/annualreport_2011/Key_Studies_Projects_And_Prog
rams.aspx (last visited Dec. 22, 2012) (follow “Key Studies Projects and
Programs” hyperlink; then follow “Case Management/Electronic Case Files”
hyperlink).
304. See LoPucki, supra note 16, at 486-88.
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already have this search capability.305 The ASFRG identified
similar design features in its final report.306 So far, CM/ECF
planners have hesitated to make this search capability publicly
available for two reasons. First, they are concerned that such
complex searches might negatively impact CM/ECF’s technical
performance.307 Second, because the general public then would
be able to search for all information under a particular judge’s
name, they believe that this capability might violate the longstanding JCUS policy of not releasing judge-specific
information.308
The third design feature would require all CM/ECF filers
to upload their documents to CM/ECF in an automatically
importable electronic format. Such an automatically importable
format has been the subject of an ongoing software trial in the
federal bankruptcy courts. Since 2005, the federal bankruptcy
courts have mandated the use of data-enabled “fillable” PDF
bankruptcy forms in most electronically filed bankruptcy
cases.309 “Users of these forms ‘code’ the data as they create it,
by entering it into fields (boxes) in specified formats—
essentially the way customers fill out order forms on the
[i]nternet.”310 These relational forms tag each entry “as the

305. AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at 11-12.
306. Id. at 18-19.
307. Id. at 12.
308. Id. at 12 n.8. This and other privacy concerns are examined below.
This Article argues for a simple privacy standard where information that
otherwise would be public should be publicly available on CM/ECF. See infra
Part IV.A.4.
The Judicial Conference’s policy is counter to public transparency and should
be revoked. Because a judge’s name on an individual case docket sheet or
opinion is already publicly available, it is nonsensical to limit the searching
and aggregation of what otherwise would be public information. Judges have
a great deal of power—to include literally the power of life and death—and
should be held publicly accountable. The public should be able to find out how
judges have ruled overall in a variety of different kinds of cases. Allowing this
policy to stand makes the Judicial Conference look like an elitist, selfpromoting club and erodes public confidence in judicial integrity.
309. Memorandum from Admin. Office of U.S. Courts to Bankr. Petition
Preparation Software Cos., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 1 (Sept. 23, 2005),
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/defs/docs/smart_forms_ltr.pdf; see also
LoPucki, supra note 16, at 484 & n.4.
310. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 484.
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value of a characteristic of an object.”311 Data management,
spreadsheet, and statistical analysis programs then “can
process” such coded empirical data “into statistics, tables, and
graphs.”312 The ASFRG also identified this design feature in its
final report.313
Before CM/ECF, litigants were required to complete and
attach standard paper court forms to their paper filings when
manually submitting them to the court clerk.314 In a similar
fashion, CM/ECF filers can be required either to attach a
completed data-enabled fillable PDF form with the required
coding to every electronic filing or to write all electronic filings
solely on fillable PDF forms.
Finally, the ability to update automatically the results
from previous CM/ECF searches with cases added since the
last search would allow rulemaking empirical studies to stay
current at minimal cost. According to one CM/ECF empirical
researcher, because of the problems with the current system,
“only a handful” of CM/ECF empirical studies are presently
updated.315
Incorporating these design features into the Next
Generation system could potentially transform EBP not only in
the federal judiciary but also, by example, in the rest of the
federal government. The current CM/ECF system, however,
actually hinders EBP.
B. Current CM/ECF Coding Is Cumbersome
As one researcher commented, using the current CM/ECF
system for empirical research is almost prohibitively resource311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See generally AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note
269, at 17-19.
314. See Court Forms by Number, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/formsandfees/forms/courtforms.aspx#_UJcangqqEns.
pdfonline (last visited Dec. 23, 2012). For example, a completed Form JS 044:
Civil Cover Sheet has been attached to every federal civil complaint since
1974. See, e.g., Civil Cover Sheet, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (Sept. 2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FormsAndFees/Forms/JS044.pdf
[hereinafter AOUSC, Civil Cover Sheet].
315. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 486-87.
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intensive.316 Although hundreds if not thousands of researchers
use CM/ECF data,317 they are unable to download usable data
directly from CM/ECF.318 Because CM/ECF’s current search
capabilities are extremely limited,319 researchers often must
identify relevant cases from separate sources, independent of
CM/ECF.320 Although CM/ECF documents are PDFs,321 they
are not required to have renderable (and thus searchable)
text.322 Often the PDFs are merely scanned images of
insufficient quality to be converted to text through optical
character recognition software.323
As a result, researchers typically print out hard copies of
relevant documents in every CM/ECF case and then have
human coders manually code them.324 This Article shall call the
current method of coding CM/ECF cases using human manual
coders simply “current coding” and the contemporaneous
coding of CM/ECF cases as mandated by the proposed Model
Rule and as implemented in the FCCEDD325 simply
“contemporaneous coding.” Under current coding, training,
hiring, and cross-checking manual coders can be quite timeconsuming and expensive.326 By minimizing the need for
manual coding, contemporaneous coding can improve the
quality of federal court empirical data.

316. See Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District
Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973, 987 (2008).
317. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 486.
318. See id. at 486-87.
319. See AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at 11.
320. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 486. There are searchable, albeit limited,
aftermarket CM/ECF databases available. See, e.g., Jennifer Behrens,
Research Guides: Court Records and Briefs, J. MICHAEL GOODSON LAW
LIBRARY
AT
DUKE
UNIV.
SCH.
OF
LAW,
http://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/lib/recordsbriefs.pdf (last updated July
2012).
321. About CM/ECF, supra note 267.
322. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 486-87.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 484.
325. For further discussion, see supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
326. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis
of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 110 n.192, 111 (2008) (collecting
authorities).
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C. Contemporaneous Coding Can Code More Data at a Lower
Cost
The advantage of contemporaneous coding over current
coding is not in accuracy but rather in economies of scale.
Contemporaneous coding can code many more CM/ECF cases
at a much lower cost than current coding.
As explained above, the primary difference between
current coding and contemporaneous coding is that current
coding is done retroactively by an uninvolved party327 whereas
contemporaneous coding is done prospectively by an involved
party.328 The current coding of CM/ECF cases requires hiring
human coders to code every document in each case manually.329
Because the coder is unfamiliar with the case, she must take
time to read over each document she is reviewing to ensure
that the proper variables and values are coded. This reviewing
time means that she would code this document much slower
than someone who was already familiar with the particular
document and the underlying lawsuit. To guide manual coders,
researchers must also develop coding schema, “a detailing of
each variable of interest, along with the values of each
variable,”330 and carefully document such schema in codebooks,
“guides they employ to code their data and that others can use
to replicate, reproduce, update, or build on the variables the
resulting database contains and any analyses generated from
it.”331 To double check the coding’s accuracy, another coder
must re-code a random sample of the same documents to
confirm that both coders applied the coding schema the same
way.332 It is easy to see how current coding can be costly and
yet only code a small fraction of the available documents and
cases on CM/ECF.333

327. See supra Part III.B.
328. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
329. See generally Hall & Wright, supra note 326, at 109-11, 110 n.192.
330. Epstein & Martin, Quantitative Approaches, supra note 30, at 911.
331. Id.
332. MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 30, at 67; see Hall & Wright, supra
note 326, at 113.
333. See Hall & Wright, supra note 326, at 110 & n.192, 111.
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In contrast, contemporaneous coding should be
inexpensive—if not free—and code all available CM/ECF cases
and documents filed after the Model Rule’s adoption. Because
the Model Rule and its implementation in the next generation
of CM/ECF would make contemporaneous coding a required
step in the electronic filing process, manual human coders
would be needed only to double check a random sample of the
relevant dataset.334 Furthermore, because the underlying case
documents are associated with the relevant contemporaneous
coding,335 manual human coders can easily access the
documents associated with a coding sample and re-code them.
Even though the adversarial process should ensure coding
accuracy, researchers nevertheless always should double check
a random sample.
This Article recommends contemporaneous coding not for
its own sake, but rather so that the resulting descriptive
empirical dataset can provide a shared baseline for policy
debate.336 Because this dataset must be indisputably objective
for all sides in a policy debate to accept it, contemporaneous
coding is limited to case-related outcomes.337 Case-related
outcomes are easily verifiable facts about the personal
characteristics, proffered arguments, and litigation results in a
particular case.338 They are facts over which the parties, the
court clerk, and the presiding judge in a particular case would
agree. Although there is often disagreement over an
argument’s legal merit, there should be agreement over a
description of the argument’s reasoning.339 Although coders
normally should not have a personal stake in what they are
coding,340 there is little risk of bias in the Model Rule. This is
because contemporaneous coding is restricted to factual
334. Id.
335. For further discussion, see supra notes 285-90.
336. For further discussion, see supra Part I.B.
337. See supra note 4.
338. Id.
339. If there is disagreement, then the remedy is a motion for a more
definite statement. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).
340. Epstein & Martin, Coding Variables, supra note 5, at 326; see also
Richard A. Posner, Some Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards and
Livermore, 59 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1181 (2010) (expressing skepticism over
“judicial self-reporting . . . as a valid source of knowledge”).
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outcomes vetted by the adversarial process.
While these case-related outcomes might be available on
the current CM/ECF, many of them have not been coded.341 For
example, while the current CM/ECF might have a PDF of a
motion for summary judgment available for download, current
coding does not code any arguments in the motion. To obtain
that information, a researcher currently must examine the
PDF and code the arguments herself. In contrast,
contemporaneous coding would have already coded the
arguments in the motion in a downloadable format. This would
alleviate the need to examine the PDF except to verify
reliability.
Both current coding and contemporaneous coding can code
case-based outcomes with comparable reliability. Of the three
“R” questions to guide the selection of evidence for EBP,342 the
third “R”, reliability, concerns “how well-founded—
theoretically, empirically”343—is the evidence? Although the
word “reliability” was employed to maintain the alliterative
acronym, this reliability idea can be broken down further into
two related concepts—statistical reliability and statistical
validity.344
First, contemporaneous coding should be at least as
statistically reliable as current coding. Statistical reliability is
“the extent to which it is possible to replicate a measurement,
reproducing the same value (regardless of whether it is the
right one) on the same standard for the same subject at the
same time.”345 For example, a thermometer is statistically
reliable if you can stick it your mouth one hundred times and
get the same temperature reading. Although you do not know if
the temperature reading is accurate, you do know that the
thermometer is consistent. Because coding under either
341. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
343. Solesbury, supra note 18, at 9.
344. To avoid confusion, this Article uses the words “statistical
reliability” to distinguish this concept from the broader “reliability” concept of
the three R’s. See id. But the term “reliability” is usually used in empirical
literature without the “statistical” modifier. See, e.g., LAWLESS ET AL., supra
note 82, at 42. Likewise, the term “validity” is usually used in empirical
literature without the “statistical” modifier. Id. at 36.
345. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 83.
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method is limited to case-related outcomes, both current coding
and contemporaneous coding should be able to code such
simple facts consistently.
In fact, contemporaneous coding might arguably be more
statistically
reliable
than
current
coding.
With
contemporaneous coding, the coders—the party counsel, court
clerk, or presiding judge—not only have the most firsthand
knowledge of the document which they are coding, but also
have a special ethical and professional duty to code the
document correctly.346 The formal authority of the proposed
Model Rule, the adversarial process, the court’s scrutiny, the
duty of candor under Rule 11, and the knowledge that the
public can search the coding using a judge’s or counsel’s
name347 should all help ensure contemporaneous coding’s
statistical reliability. With current coding, the coders have
neither firsthand knowledge of the document that they are
coding nor a special ethical or professional duty to code the
document correctly.
Second, contemporaneous coding should be as statistically
valid as current coding. Statistical validity is “the extent to
which a reliable measure reflects the underlying concept being
measured.”348 For example, a statistically reliable, but invalid,
thermometer might consistently give you the wrong
temperature, ten degrees lower than the actual temperature.
In comparison, a statistically valid thermometer would give
you the correct temperature. Again, in light of the factual
simplicity of case-based outcomes, both current coding and
contemporaneous coding should be able to be statistically valid.
In fact, contemporaneous coding might be more
statistically valid than current coding for legal outcomes
because contemporaneous coders are generally legally trained
whereas current coders need not be. There are complex
questions of legal doctrine that attorneys or judges well versed
in the relevant law might reliably code correctly, but nonlegally trained (or legal novice) manual coders might reliably

346. See supra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
347. See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
348. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 87.
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code incorrectly.349 As Judge Harry Edwards observed, legal
doctrine is difficult to translate “into data that are susceptible
to mathematical analysis.”350 The close study of legal doctrine
“‘is impossible with currently available or readily foreseeable
empirical tools.’”351 This is a serious issue, because precedents
“‘fix the point of departure from which the labor of the judge
begins.’”352
With current coding, “the overriding goal of a codebook—
and indeed the entire coding process—is to minimize the need
for interpretation.”353 Consequently, current coding might avoid
coding legal outcomes altogether even though they might
nevertheless be factual, case-related outcomes.354
In contrast, contemporaneous coding can leverage its
coders’ insider legal expertise to code legal outcomes better.
When coding legal outcomes, there is no substitute for legal
training. Recall that case-related outcomes require consensus
from all parties and the judge.355 Thus, only bright-line, wellestablished legal outcomes can be coded.
Even researchers trained in outsider “Law and” disciplines
who never went to law school might make coding decisions with
which lawyers might disagree.356 Without losing the necessary
349. For an example of an empirical study that codes legal outcomes, see
Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis
of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 481-82 (2009).
350. Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of
Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1910 (2009).
351. Id. at 1903 (quoting FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 202 (2007)).
352. Id. at 1897 (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process 20 (Yale Univ. Press 22nd ed. 1964) (1921)).
353. Epstein & Martin, Coding Variables, supra note 5, at 326.
354. For example, Judge Edwards claims that the Songer U.S. Court of
Appeals Database does not code the content of any opinions. Edwards &
Livermore, supra note 350, at 1926. See generally U.S. Appeals Courts
Database, supra note 257.
355. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
356. As David Kennedy and William Fisher III explained:
Scholars in [other fields] all refer to law, and each of these
disciplines has its own—outsider’s—idea about what law is
and how it works. The experience of lawyers and legal
scholars reading the work of colleagues in other fields is
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focus on outcomes, contemporaneous coding can help innovate
more sophisticated empirical approaches to understanding
legal doctrine and legal decision making by “mov[ing] beyond
asking which litigant prevailed in a case and now also ask[ing]
how the advocates and the court framed the question presented
and how the legal analysis unfolded in the opinion.”357 Perhaps
contemporaneous coding can even help develop a uniquely legal
empirical methodology.358
For example, school desegregation law is a complex,
specialized area of legal doctrine.359 Although the distinction
between de jure mandatory and de facto voluntary school
segregation is elementary to anyone familiar with the law, it
might be arcane to someone unfamiliar with the law. This
simple distinction, however, is fundamental to school
desegregation law because “[s]chool districts that had engaged
in [de jure] segregation had an affirmative constitutional duty
to desegregate; those that were [de facto] segregated did not.”360
This is because only de jure segregation violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution.361

often a frustrating one. “If only they had a better sense of
how law worked from the inside,” we often think, or “if only
they had gone to law school.”
David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, Preface to THE CANON OF AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT, at ix (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, eds. 2006)
(emphasis in original).
357. Gregory Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative
Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
873, 885 (2008) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)); see also Edwards & Livermore, supra note 350, at
1927.
358. Hall & Wright, supra note 326, at 63.
359. Because new desegregation lawsuits are extremely rare, even most
lawyers have little reason to know school desegregation law. Today, school
desegregation law is primarily considered a historical legal doctrine whose
relevance has largely passed. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The “We’ve Done
Enough” Theory of School Desegregation, 39 HOW. L.J. 767 (1996).
360. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 794 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
361. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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Whether a court has ever found a school district to have
engaged in de jure segregation is a case-based legal outcome.
Under contemporaneous coding, the trial lawyers or presiding
judge in a school desegregation case would be able to code that
legal outcome with no trouble. Under current coding, however,
an outsider coder unfamiliar with school desegregation law
might have difficulty coding that legal outcome. If the law
changes, then the coding scheme must be revised to reflect the
change.
Recall that the purpose of case coding is to create the
FCCEDD, a new multi-user dataset of federal court outcomes.
Because contemporaneous coding can code much more data
than current coding, contemporaneous coding provides greater
data on which to base inferences362 and is less likely than
current coding to create a dataset that suffers from selective
deposit363 or selective survival.364
The comprehensive case outcome data produced through
contemporaneous coding would be online, electronic, and
searchable by computer. “Most case coding projects” since the
early 1980’s “have taken advantage of the ability to select cases
using structured computer searches . . . .”365 One of the
FCCEDD’s potential scholarly contributions to the body of
public electronic knowledge on the federal courts is the
comprehensive coding of unpublished opinions.366
IV. Contemporaneous Coding of Federal Court Cases
The purpose of contemporaneous coding of cases in
CM/ECF is to create the FCCEDD and thereby provide a
descriptive baseline of objective empirical data for EBP.367 The
362. For further discussion, see supra note 258 and accompanying text.
363. For further discussion, see supra note 253 and accompanying text.
364. For further discussion, see supra note 254 and accompanying text.
365. Hall & Wright, supra note 326, at 106.
366. In 2007, less than seventeen percent of all court of appeals opinions
were published. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 350, at 1923 & n.69. The
Songer Database of court of appeals opinions codes only published opinions.
See id. at 1922-23. The decision whether to publish or not to publish an
opinion is far from random. Id. at 1923. Contemporaneous coding can
supplement the Songer Database with unpublished court of appeals opinions.
367. For further discussion about the need for a descriptive empirical
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only way to do this is by ensuring that the resulting data are
acceptable to all sides in any rulemaking debate. For the
FCCEDD to be effective the data cannot be oversimplified or
subjective. The data’s reliability must be beyond question.368
Accordingly, the data must (1) be limited to authentic
outcomes369 about the coded cases; (2) be coded and collected in
a uniform manner; and (3) balance workability with utility.
First, authentic outcomes are facts that remain the same
regardless of normative outlook.370 They are facts about the
parties’ idiosyncratic characteristics or proffered arguments
and the results of the lawsuit over which there would be no
dispute from the parties or the assigned judge.
For example, the fact that the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss371 two of the plaintiff’s four causes of action would be
an authentic outcome. It can be independently verified by
examining the official case filings. Neither the plaintiff, nor the
defendant, nor the court would disagree with that fact. Another
outcome would be the fact that the court dismissed one cause of
action but denied dismissing the other. Again, that outcome
could be independently verified by consulting the case docket
sheet372 and the court’s filed memorandum order.373
In contrast, whether the defendant’s motion was well
written or whether the court was correct in its ruling would not
be an authentic outcome because such determinations are too
subjective to garner universal agreement of its validity.374 Not
everyone might agree with the criteria used to determine
whether a motion is well written or whether a court’s ruling is
justified based upon the language of the pleadings and prior
precedent. As another example, many empirical studies of
judicial decision making measure judicial ideology.375 Even
baseline in EBP, see supra Part I.B.
368. For further discussion about reliability, see supra Part I.B.
369. See supra notes 4 and 257.
370. Rhee, supra note 4, at 1326-27.
371. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
372. See
also
Court
Records,
ADMIN.
OFF.
U.S.
CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/CourtRecords.aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 2012).
373. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b)(1).
374. See Rhee, supra note 4, at 1326-27.
375. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 350, at 1903-04. Accord AYRES,
supra note 34, at 181 (describing the conflict regarding the use of
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though such ideological criteria might be represented as
reliable measures clearly defined in a codebook,376 its statistical
validity is questionable because they usually employ
oversimplified assumptions to ensure reliability.377
Second, to ensure the FCCEDD’s consistency, its data
must be coded and collected uniformly. Rule 5(d)(3) currently
allows electronic filing to be governed by local rule.378 While
most local federal district and circuit court CM/ECF webpages
appear substantially similar, they have implemented e-filing
differently.379 Because jurisdictional coding differences would
defeat the EBP purpose behind the data, only uniform national
implementation of the next generation CM/ECF will
accomplish the EBP purpose of contemporaneous case
coding.380 Rule 5(d)(3) thus should be amended to read:
Papers filed, signed, or verified by electronic
means must be consistent with the uniform
technical standards established by the Judicial
Conference of the United States. Such standards
must allow reasonable exceptions to electronic
filing. A paper filed electronically is a written
paper for the purposes of these rules.
Finally, the FCCEDD’s coding scheme must balance
workability with utility. Coding should be relatively easy to
complete and should not add a meaningful research or
completion burden to any filing. Ideally, the additional fillable
PDF forms or online drop down menus381 used for CM/ECF
scientifically based methods verses holistic methods of teaching).
376. See Epstein & Martin, Coding Variables, supra note 5, at 321.
377. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 350, at 1905-07.
378. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
379. See AOUSC, NEXT GENERATION OF CM/ECF, supra note 269, at 611.
380. Recognizing the research utility of allowing some coding variance
by judicial district or circuit, the proposed rule below makes public
information coding uniform and mandatory but allows for regional
experimentation with voluntary coding of nonpublic or specialized
information. See infra Part IV.A.
381. For further discussion of these two possible technical
implementations of the next generation CM/ECF, see supra Introduction &
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contemporaneous coding should ask for outcomes readily
available to any filing counsel and not take more than a few
minutes per filing. Furthermore, because many attorneys are
already familiar with CM/ECF, it should not be difficult for
them to learn how to code more variables. That being said, the
Advisory Committee should privilege utility over workability.
Even if practitioners consider the new coding requirements
burdensome, they will comply because they want to file or
contest lawsuits in federal court.382
To get the ball rolling, this Article proposes an imperfect
working draft Model Rule (along with a draft Advisory
Committee Note) and a possible FCCEDD coding scheme for
complaints and answers. With its characteristic calm, care, and
comprehensiveness,383 the Advisory Committee can no doubt
improve upon this proposal. To ensure the FCCEDD’s
uniformity, contemporaneous case coding should be mandated
Part III.A.
382. Some practitioners invested in the status quo and adverse to
change undoubtedly would oppose this proposal. Hopefully, they would
recognize how a publicly-searchable FCCEDD would improve their tactical
and strategic research of judges, opposing counsel, parties, and expert
witnesses and potentially bring them additional business. See infra Part
IV.A.4 for further discussion. Similar complaints of increased workload and
general resistance to change were rejected when the federal courts first
mandated electronic filing or when courts adopted “to video and audio
recording, to microfilm and computer tape, and, in the more distant past, to
novel indexing schemes like citation tables and legal citation indexes.”
Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition
to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 773
n.1 (2012) (citing Patti Ogden, “Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law”: A
Story of Legal Citation Indexes, 85 LAW. LIBR. J. 1 (1993)).
In the final analysis, technological or informational improvements in any
area of government simply require the political will to force practitioners to
comply with new requirements. If forced to comply, practitioners will fall in
line with even seemingly ridiculous requirements because they are willing to
pay to play. For example, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California requires courtesy copies of electronic filings mailed to the Judge’s
chambers to be “blue-backed” with a blue backing paper. C.D. CAL. LOC. R. 54.5,
available
at
http://court.cacd.uscourts.gov/Cacd/LocRules.nsf/a224d2a6f8771599882567cc
005e9d79/68db23614f0a0a058825768d00763043?OpenDocument.
While
many practitioners might agree that this bizarre, anachronistic practice not
only appears to defeat some of the benefits of e-filing but also is burdensome,
they all comply because they must to file or to contest federal lawsuits in the
Central District of California.
383. See, e.g., Kravitz, supra note 45, at 216-18.
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by a new Federal Rule. Likewise, to ensure the FCCEDD’s
representativeness and reliability, the coding scheme should
focus on authentic outcomes and should be developed through
collaboration between academics, practitioners, and judges.
A. A New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
After presenting the Model Rule and a draft Advisory
Committee Note explaining the Model Rule, this section
examines the two most common criticisms of the Model Rule—
concerns about cost and privacy.
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1. The Proposed Model Rule
Rule 1.1. Evidence-Based Rulemaking
(a) Purpose. The success of these rules in implementing
the goals of Rule 1 must be continually assessed with objective,
transparent, and methodologically sound empirical evidence. In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-75, the Supreme Court, the
Judicial Conference of the United States, all committees or
subcommittees on civil rules of practice and procedure, and the
Federal Judicial Center are committed to ensuring that these
rules as much as possible embody assumptions based upon
demonstrable empirical evidence and factual reality. This rule
does not apply to any reasonable exceptions to electronic filing
in accordance with Rule 5(d)(3).
(b) Case Coding. To provide empirical evidence with
which to assess the rules’ success in implementing Rule 1, all
electronically filed cases will be subject to mandatory and
voluntary case coding questions.
(1) Mandatory. The Judicial Conference of the United
States will establish and maintain uniform technical
standards for the mandatory coding of all electronically
filed cases in the federal courts. A database of this
mandatory coding called the Federal Courts CM/ECF
Descriptive Dataset (“FCCEDD”) will be publicly available
and searchable by registered electronic filer name.
(A) No Opt Out. No federal court may opt out of this
mandatory coding.
(B) Publicly Available Information. In general,
mandatory coding will be limited to information that is
already publicly available.
(C) Signed Nonbinding Representation to the Court.
All registered electronic filers are required to answer all
mandatory
coding
questions
honestly
before
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electronically filing any pleading, written motion, or
other paper. The Notice of Electronic Filing384 e-mailed
to every registered user will contain the filing’s
mandatory coding.
(i) Ethical Duty of Candor. Such mandatory
coding is considered to be a signed representation to
the court and is thereby subject to all the applicable
disclosure requirements in these rules.
(ii) No Estoppel. Although case coding will
neither bind the parties nor have precedential value,
the court and all parties share a professional
obligation, consistent with the goals of Rule 1.1(a), to
ensure that all mandatory coding accurately reflects
the factual reality of their lawsuit.
(2) Voluntary. A court may, by local rule or
administrative order, add voluntary coding questions to
the uniform mandatory coding questions. Such voluntary
coding must be consistent with any technical standards
established by the Judicial Conference of the United States
and will apply only to cases electronically filed in that
particular court. Subject to the collecting court’s conditions
or limitations, this voluntary coding will be publicly
available in the FCCEDD.
(A) Flexible Purpose. The purpose of voluntary
coding is to provide a court with the discretion to
conduct local experiments and to collect additional
empirical evidence to evaluate the rules. To provide the
court with accurate, useful research, all electronically
filing parties are encouraged—but not required—to
answer voluntary coding questions with the same
candor as a signed representation to the court.

384. See supra text accompanying note 289.
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(B) Can Include Non-Public Information. Voluntary
coding can collect non-public information. The court will
make every effort to safeguard such nonpublic
information. Unless a court order or local rule or
procedure mandates otherwise, the Notice of Electronic
Filing e-mailed to every registered user will not contain
the filing’s voluntary coding.
(C) Limited Waiver of Privileged Non-Public
Information. If a court inadvertently discloses nonpublic
information collected through voluntary coding, the
privilege protections of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b)
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) will
apply with the filing party acting as the holder of the
privilege.
(c) Correction Procedure. There is a formal correction
procedure only for mandatory coding.
(1) Mandatory Coding. Technical accuracy in
mandatory coding should be enforced with the same level
of care and professionalism as with any other rule.
Opposing counsel, the court, and the court clerk should
scrutinize mandatory coding with the same attention to
detail given to the underlying filed document.
(A) If a Party’s Coding Is in Error. If a party has
erroneously coded its filed document, the opposing party
must first attempt to meet and confer with the filing
party to persuade it to amend its coding before
submitting a motion to correct mandatory case coding.
(i) Meet and Confer Requirement. If opposing
counsel believes that a filing party’s mandatory
coding does not accurately reflect the underlying
filed document, opposing counsel should first
attempt informally to meet and confer with the filing
party in a manner similar to Rule 37(a)(1).
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(ii) Motion to Correct Mandatory Case Coding. If
the filing party refuses to amend its mandatory
coding, opposing counsel should then file a motion to
correct mandatory case coding with the court
concisely detailing the disparity between the
mandatory coding and the underlying filed
document and include a certification that the
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to
confer with the filing party to correct the erroneous
mandatory coding without court action.
(B) If the Court’s Coding Is in Error. If a party
believes that the court’s mandatory coding does not
accurately reflect the underlying order of the court, then
the party should file a motion to correct mandatory case
coding with the court summarizing the error and
specifying the requested correction.
(C) Original Filing Court Final Arbiter of Motion.
The court where the disputed mandatory coding was
originally filed will be the final arbiter of a motion to
correct mandatory case coding. Although a court must
enter an order into the record explaining its reasons for
granting or denying the motion, such an order itself is
non-appealable. It is, however, part of the record and as
such can be used as evidence of error in a subsequent
appeal. This arrangement should balance the need to
ensure coding accuracy with a desire to avoid
unnecessary satellite litigation.
(2) Voluntary Coding. Because Rule 1.1(b)(2)(A) states
that voluntary coding is not required, there is no formal
correction procedure.
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2. Proposed Advisory Committee Note385
Rule 1.1 implements recommendations first made in a
1995 Self-Study commissioned by the Rules Standing
Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See
Daniel R. Coquillette, A Self-Study of Federal Judicial
Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range
Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and
Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168
F.R.D. 679 (1995) (Report prepared by Thomas E. Baker and
Frank H. Easterbrook). Specifically, the Self-Study’s
Recommendation 6 stated, “Each Advisory Committee should
ground its proposals on available data and develop mechanisms
for gathering and evaluating data that are not otherwise
available, and should use these data to decide whether changes
in existing rules should be proposed.” Id. at 699.
Evidence-based rulemaking seeks to make this
recommendation a reality. Evidence-based rulemaking is a
subset of so-called evidence-based policymaking, perhaps more
accurately (but less pithily) labeled “evidence-informed
policymaking or research-shaped decision making.” KAREN
BOGENSCHNEIDER & THOMAS J. CORBETT, EVIDENCE-BASED
POLICYMAKING: INSIGHTS FROM POLICY-MINDED RESEARCHERS
AND RESEARCH-MINDED POLICYMAKERS 4 (2010). Evidencebased rulemaking assumes that there is a set of research
methods that serious “scholars agree constitutes a proper way
for helping us distinguish fact from belief” and “that a body of
sound knowledge can be developed to help address even the
most contentious of social policy issues” including federal civil
rulemaking. Id.
Specifically, the Rule leverages the federal courts’ case
management/electronic case filing (“CM/ECF”) system to create
comprehensive, reliable, and inexpensive empirical data in a
national Federal Courts CM/ECF Descriptive Dataset
(“FCCEDD”—pronounced “fuh-said” for short). Starting from
the date of the Rule’s adoption onward, Rule 1.1(b)(1) requires
all parties, the court clerk, and the presiding judge to answer
385. Consistent with Advisory Committee formatting guidelines, all
citations in this draft Note are in the text.
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uniform mandatory coding questions before filing any pleading,
motion, order, or other paper in the CM/ECF system. This
coding
should
provide
objective,
transparent,
and
methodologically sound empirical data for the FCCEDD. In
turn, the FCCEDD should provide an objective factual baseline
with which to evaluate past and future rulemaking.
The only way such mandatory coding can provide an
objective factual baseline is if it accurately reflects the factual
reality in every electronically filed case. Because mandatory
case coding is derivative of the underlying filed documents,
there is no need to treat mandatory case coding independent of
its underlying filed documents. Rule 1.1(b)(1)(C) thus
recognizes that case coding, unlike the actual language of filed
documents, lacks independent legal authority. Case coding is
analogous to the Reporter of Decisions’s syllabi to Supreme
Court opinions. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906).
Notwithstanding mandatory coding’s lack of binding legal
authority, the federal courts and the Bar must cultivate a
culture of coding compliance among judges, judges’ law clerks,
court staff, counsel, and counsel’s staff to effectuate the goals of
Rule 1.1(a). Although as recognized in Rule 1.1(b)(1)(C)(ii) a
party may not be estopped by its own mandatory coding, that
party is still subject to ethical and professional discipline to
include Rule 11 sanctions.
The Administrative Office of United States Courts will
maintain the FCCEDD. Ideally, the FCCEDD should be
available to the public online, possess an easy-to-use user
interface that allows for keyword and full-text searching (to
include automatically updating prior searches with additional
search results added since the last search), and allow the
download of information automatically into electronic formats
compatible with popular statistical analysis programs.
It is in everyone’s self-interest to ensure accurate coding
because not only shall the coding provide the raw data for this
powerful, searchable, public database, but also as a result such
coding will impact professional reputations of the judges,
lawyers, and pro se counsel in the case. The general public—
not to mention judges, lawyers, and potential clients—will be
able to search the FCCEDD by name on the internet and
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receive as search results the aggregated coding in all
electronically filed lawsuits where the searched name was a
registered CM/ECF filer.
Making all registered filers in a particular electronically
filed case publicly responsible for the accuracy of mandatory
coding and limiting Rule 1.1(c)’s correction procedure only to
mandatory coding attempts to balance ensuring mandatory
coding’s accuracy with avoiding unnecessary satellite litigation.
To avoid unnecessary appeals over mandatory coding disputes,
Rule 1.1(c)(1)(C) gives the court where the disputed mandatory
coding was originally filed the final, unreviewable say on
motions to correct mandatory case coding.
For example, if the disputed mandatory coding was
originally filed in federal district court, then the presiding
federal district judge would be the final arbiter on a motion to
correct mandatory case coding. If the district court denies the
motion, the movant cannot appeal based solely upon the denial
but can refer to the district court’s order denying the motion as
evidence to support an appeal on another issue. If the court of
appeals agrees with the movant and reverses the district court,
then the court of appeals can order as part of its relief the
correction of the erroneous mandatory coding.
If the disputed mandatory coding concerned an appellate
brief filed in the court of appeals, then the assigned three-judge
panel would be the final arbiter on a motion to correct
mandatory case coding. If the circuit panel denies the motion,
the movant cannot petition for a rehearing en banc or for a writ
of certiorari based solely upon the denial but can refer to the
panel’s order denying the motion as evidence to support a
rehearing or appeal on another issue. If the en banc court of
appeals or the Supreme Court agrees with the movant that the
panel erred, then it can order as part of its relief the correction
of the erroneous mandatory coding.
Courts are encouraged to adopt standing orders or local
rules and procedures to ensure coding accuracy. At a minimum,
judges should formally inform all parties of the importance of
accurate mandatory coding and how a party’s coding accuracy,
like properly stating the holding of a case precedent in a brief,
can make a lasting positive first impression on the court and
opposing counsel.
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In a complementary manner, Rule 1.1(b)(2) allows
individual federal district courts, a court of appeals, or the U.S.
Supreme Court to ask the electronic filers in their respective
jurisdictions to answer additional questions voluntarily.
Because of the range of possible voluntary questions, the
collecting court has discretion to limit or restrict access to such
voluntary coding but as a general rule should aspire to make
voluntary coding publicly available in the FCCEDD. Depending
on the nature of the voluntary coding, the court may need to
remove identifying data or to disassociate the voluntary coding
from its underlying documents before posting it on the
FCCEDD. Ideally, voluntary coding questions will employ the
same CM/ECF user interface as mandatory coding questions.
To promote imaginative research, a court can be creative
with its voluntary coding questions. Such voluntary questions
can run the gamut from nonpublic outcome information, to
surveys collected by the Federal Judicial Center or an academic
researcher, to random experimentation. Rule 1.1(b)(2)(A)’s
“local experiments” language refers both to the broader concept
of decentralized laboratories of federalism similar to the
district-by-district case management plans mandated by the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089 (1990), and to actual random experiments testing the
effectiveness of new or proposed rules amendments. A court
can require participants in a policy experiment to answer what
would otherwise be voluntary questions about the experiment.
To ensure accurate coding, a court should stress to experiment
participants that both the adversarial process and Rule 11
apply to their case.
Rule 1.1 should not be interpreted as authorizing random
experimental testing of the rules. Only Congress should
authorize such random experimental testing through federal
legislation. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Experimentation in the Law:
Report of the Federal Judicial Center Advisory Committee on
Experimentation in the Law (1981); Carl Tobias, A Modest
Reform for Federal Procedural Rulemaking: Complex Litigation
at the Millennium, 64 L. & Contemp. Probs. 283, 287 (2001);
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the U.S., Proposed Rules: Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991)
(proposing a never-adopted revision to Rule 83(b), “[w]ith the
approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States, a
district court may adopt an experimental local rule inconsistent
with these rules if it is consistent with the provisions of Title
28 of the United States Code and is limited in its period of
effectiveness to five years or less.”).
Rule 1.1(b)(1)(C) expands upon Rule 5(d)(3)’s language that
a “paper filed electronically is a written paper for purposes of
these rules” to make clear that electronic filers are to treat
mandatory coding with the same level of professionalism,
diligence, and candor as any other signed representation to the
court.
Finally, in the unlikely event that a court inadvertently
discloses nonpublic information collected through voluntary
coding, Rule 1.1(2)(C) provides the affected party with the same
privilege protections in any subsequent lawsuit as if that party
had mistakenly disclosed the information during discovery.
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3. Cost Challenges386
Most progress, particularly technological progress, costs
money. The technological enhancements to the next generation
of CM/ECF recommended in this Article387 are no exception.
They probably would be quite expensive, particularly if they
are done right the first time. With its careful long-term
planning,388 the AOUSC appears to grasp the benefits of
designing the next generation of CM/ECF comprehensively up
front because “[j]udges and Judiciary staff now regard
information technology not as something separate from their
day-to-day work, but simply as the means by which they do
their jobs.”389 But is the cost worth it? The predictable but
appropriate response is yes. The increased technological
capabilities—to include providing an objective descriptive
factual baseline for EBP390—are worth the money.
Fortunately, Congress had the foresight in 1990 to
establish a special fund, the Judicial Information Technology
Fund (the “JITF”),391 “for the procurement . . . of information
technology resources for [judicial] program activities.”392 The
money in the JITF automatically rolls over from year to year
and cannot be used for other purposes without the AOUSC’s
approval.393 From Fiscal Year 2012 to Fiscal Year 2016, the
AOUSC has forecast its JITF expenditures to average $3.7
million per year for “Court Administration and Case
Management,”394 which “encompasses systems that manage
386. Concluding the draft Advisory Committee Note, this Article now
returns to identifying authorities in footnotes.
387. See supra Part III.A.
388. See id.
389. AOUSC, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 265, at 1.
390. See supra Part I.B.
391. 28 U.S.C. § 612 (a) (2006).
392. Id.; see also Daniel Holt, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FED. JUDICIAL HISTORY
OFFICE, FEDERAL JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS: 1792–2010, at xii-xiii (2012),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Appropriations.pdf/$file/Appropriatio
ns.pdf.
393. Holt, supra note 392, at xiii.
394. See AOUSC, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 265, at 10.
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cases and case files” like CM/ECF,395 $4.56 million per year for
“Judicial Statistics and Reporting,”396 which “includes the
collection and reporting of statistical data in the Judiciary,”397
and $134.86 million per year for the “Electronic Public Access
Program,”398 which manages PACER.399
The AOUSC has managed the JITF well, maintaining a
significant budget surplus. In 2007, the JITF carried a $146.6
million surplus, $32.2 million400 of which was public user fees
paid to PACER.401 In 2006, PACER user fees were estimated to
be about $60 million annually.402 PACER has “become what
appears to be a profit center that cross-subsidizes other IT
functions of the Judiciary.”403 In fact, the AOUSC apparently
plans to use PACER fees to fund the next generation of
CM/ECF.404
While there is some debate over whether charging PACER
fees “that are higher than the marginal cost of disseminating
the information”405 violates the E-Government Act of 2002,406
using public PACER fees to pay for the next generation of
CM/ECF is a clever and practical arrangement so long as it
does not compromise CM/ECF’s integrity or capabilities.

395. Id. at 10-11.
396. See id. at 10.
397. Id. at 12.
398. See id. at 10.
399. Id. at 12.
400. Stephen Schultze, Electronic Public Access Fees and the United
States Federal Courts’ Budget: An Overview 4 (2009) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at
Harvard University) (page number assigned as document is not otherwise
paginated),
available
at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/~sjschultze/Schultze_PACER_Budget_Working_
Paper.pdf.
401. For further discussion of PACER, see supra notes 269-74 and
accompanying text.
402. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 488 & n.17.
403. Schultze, supra note 400, at 5.
404. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 108-221, at 116 (2003)).
405. S. REP. NO. 107-174, at 23 (2002).
406. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3606 (2006); see Schultze, supra note 400, at 810.
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CM/ECF’s system design should be focused solely on what
works best and not on mercenary considerations such as the
“willingness of the commercial sector to pay PACER fees.”407
Neither should the AOUSC “grant, deny, or condition” PACER
fee exemptions “in ways that encourage researchers to portray
the [federal] courts in a positive light.”408 Such self-interested
decision making could compromise public perceptions of the
AOUSC’s impartiality.
4. Privacy Challenges
Even before the internet, court records have long been a
battleground between government transparency and individual
privacy.409 The internet and electronic court records have only
exacerbated this battle. Paradoxically, the ease of public access
to online electronic court records is, at the same time, the
dream of open government advocates and the nightmare of
privacy protectionists.410
While allied with transparency true believers, EBP views
online electronic transparency as more of a means than an end.
Likewise, EBP pragmatically opposes privacy protections
because eliminating access to individual data would reduce
contemporaneous coding’s research utility.411 From a research
perspective, one of the most appealing aspects of
contemporaneous coding is the direct association of the coding
to the underlying documents.412 Such direct association not
only is essential to confirm the statistical reliability and
validity of coding413 but also allows qualitative or mixedmethod researchers to search the coding to find specific cases
or documents that meet their research criteria.

407. Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—From Documents
to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 870 (2008).
408. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 515.
409. See, e.g., Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open
Justice in the Transition to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary
Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 774 (2012).
410. See LoPucki, supra note 16, at 485.
411. See id. at 489-90.
412. See supra Part III.A.
413. See supra Part III.C.
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As far as the federal courts are concerned, however, the
battle has been long over. The current—and predominant414—
federal “public is public” policy415 should remain. As the
Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and
Case Management concluded, “[f]ederal court case files, unless
sealed or otherwise subject to restricted access by statute,
federal rule, or Judicial Conference policy, are presumed to be
available for public inspection and copying.”416 “[D]ocuments in
case files generally should be made available electronically to
the same extent they are available at the courthouse, provided
that certain ‘personal data identifiers’ are not included in the
public file.”417 “Unless the court orders otherwise,” Rule 5.2
requires parties to redact from a filing: (1) social security and
tax identification numbers; (2) people’s birth dates; (3) minor’s
initials; or (4) a financial account number.418
As Rule 5.2 demonstrates, the federal courts have already
heard—and rejected—the privacy pleas to further limit access
to this otherwise public information.419 Because Rule 5.2 gives
414. See LoPucki, supra note 16, at 517 (stating that the predominant
view is that the “court files should be on-line to the same extent that they are
available at the courthouse”).
415. Comm. on Court Admin. & Case Mgmt., Report of the Judicial
Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management on
Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS.,
(Sept.
2001,
as
amended
Dec.
2006),
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/JudiciaryPrivacyPolicy/FormerJud
icialConferencePrivacyPolicy2006.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
416. Id. (citing Nixon v. Warner Comm., Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)).
417. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 advisory committee’s note (2007).
418. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a).
419. There are four possible privacy objections to contemporaneous
coding: (1) the aggregation of publicly available personal information in court
filings can be embarrassing or lead to identity theft; (2) making this
“practically obscure” yet public information easy to find is an invasion of
privacy; (3) it would put unnecessary pressure on judges; and (4) it would
make it easy to plagiarize lawyer’s work product. LoPucki, supra note 16, at
514; see also supra note 407. For the persuasive refutation of all of these
privacy arguments, see LoPucki, supra note 16, at 514-521.
All these arguments ask the wrong question. The real question is whether
any of this information should be public in the first place. The uncontested
answer is that all of this information is already public in individual cases. It
is nonsensical to limit what is already public information in individual
instances just because it is available in aggregate form online. Such
reasoning essentially favors wealthier institutional parties. See LoPucki,
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a court considerable discretion to redact or seal personal
information in public court filings, the answer to all of these
privacy objections is simply vigilant party counsel.
The Rule appropriately puts the onus of redacting or
sealing personal information “with counsel and the party or
non-party making the filing.”420 A filer or party thus may ask
the court to redact additional information from a filing for
“good cause”421 or to place a filing under seal without
redaction.422 The court may later order that the sealed filing
either be unsealed or that “a redacted version” be filed “for the
public record.”423
B. Coding Questions
Multi-user databases like the FCCEDD aspire for a
“combinatoric advantage” where researchers working together
on a shared database can create more useful information than
if they were working independently.424 Such databases seek to
be “so rich in content that multiple users, even those with
distinct projects, can draw on them.”425
As a result, the FCCEDD needs to provide data useful to
all
kinds
of
empirical
research.
Experimental,426
427
428
quantitative,
qualitative,
and mixed-method429 empirical
research are all invaluable to evaluate EBP in general and
supra note 16, at 514-15. For example, assume that while individual data
remained publicly available, CM/ECF restricted public access to aggregated
data. What if an aftermarket third-party obtained the public individual data,
aggregated it into a proprietary database, and then charged expensive fees to
access the database? As a result, only the rich “Haves” would be able to
benefit from the aggregated public information. Under the current “public is
public” federal rule, the less wealthy “Have Nots” would also be able to
benefit from aggregated public information.
420. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 advisory committee’s note (2007).
421. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(e).
422. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(d).
423. Id.
424. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 21-23.
425. Id. at 21.
426. BORUCH, supra note 30.
427. BRYMAN, supra note 23, at 19-20.
428. Id.
429. Nielsen, supra note 243, at 953.
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federal civil rulemaking in particular. Each method is a useful
EBP tool with complementary strengths and limitations.
A controlled policy experiment may make the most
analytical sense for EBP but is fraught with political peril.
“Without doubt, the most powerful and reliable way to
investigate the impact of a legal rule [or] procedure . . . is to
conduct a controlled experiment” because it can best “isolate
the impact” of the new rule or rule amendment “by excluding
all other factors that may account for the observed effects or
relationships.”430 One of the advantages of experiments is that
they are easy for non-experts to understand and hard to
ignore.431 The experiment’s weaknesses, however, are the
possible constitutional and ethical objections to government
policies that benefit or burden its citizens through random
chance.432 Recognizing the potential political difficulties of a
controlled policy experiment, its considerable research
effectiveness notwithstanding, this Article recommends that
Congress pass authorizing legislation before the federal courts
can employ controlled experiments to evaluate new or proposed
rules amendments.433
While quantitative methods dominate EBP, are
epistemologically the most scientifically rigorous, and provide
the most direct way to analyze large multi-user datasets like
the FCCEDD,434 qualitative methods can better answer the
question of why one proposed amendment may be preferable
over another in light of current political and factual realities.435
Qualitative methods “can help to formulate and focus the key
evaluation questions, shed light on the underlying theories
supporting intervention design, and highlight the outcomes to
be examined.”436 Although the FCCEDD is at its core a
430. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 14.
431. See Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 919.
432. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 14-15. For an explanation of how these
constitutional and ethical objections might be resolved, see Rachlinski, supra
note 18.
433. For further discussion, see supra notes 108-10, and accompanying
text.
434. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 10.
435. Id.
436. Id.
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quantitative dataset, its ability to hyperlink to the underlying
filed documents associated with particular coding is a unique
feature that can help qualitative and mixed-method
researchers identify particular cases or documents for
qualitative analysis.437
The key is to use the right tool for the right task and, most
importantly, to coordinate all the tools in the EBP toolkit
effectively. The baseline descriptive data in the FCCEDD work
with all empirical methods. Regardless of method, the
FCCEDD can provide the necessary descriptive feedback to
evaluate whether rules amendments are achieving “the
intended results without unacceptable side effects.”438
Moreover, by providing a rich, shared data source to be
used by quantitative and qualitative researchers alike, the
FCCEDD can promote greater collaboration and understanding
between different empirical methodologies. Identical FCCEDD
data can be analyzed through different methodological lenses.
A comparison of the similarities and differences between the
resulting studies can help inform the strengths and limitations
of each form of inquiry.439
To provide data useful to all empirical methods, however,
requires flexible yet comprehensive coding questions. Perhaps
the FCCEDD’s most difficult challenge is selecting the
appropriate coding questions to gather such data. Perfecting
the FCCEDD’s coding questions would be a massive
undertaking requiring thoughtful analysis and careful testing
and evaluation. Although a detailed discussion of drafting,
testing, and revising such coding questions is beyond the scope
of this Article, four general principles should guide the effort:
(1) involve all stakeholders in creating the coding questions; (2)
continuously evaluate the coding questions’ effectiveness; (3)
safeguard the objectivity of coding through total transparency
and thoughtful, timely responsiveness to constructive criticism;
and (4) start with best practices, and don’t reinvent the wheel.

437. See supra notes 10-11, 286-88, 334-36 and accompanying text.
438. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 14.
439. INTERUNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, supra note
258, at 4.
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First, although the AOUSC should ultimately administer
the FCCEDD, all stakeholders to include the practicing Bar,
the academy, the Advisory Committee, and the FJC must be
involved in the coding process to maintain the FCCEDD’s
objectivity. While the AOUSC has a statutory mandate “to
prepare and transmit . . . statistical data and reports as to the
business of the courts,”440 the AOUSC is not independent from
the judiciary.441 In the past, researchers examining AOUSCsupplied empirical court data have turned up “startling levels
of inaccuracy.”442 In light of the AOUSC’s less-than-stellar past
track record443 and the separation-of-powers concerns that the
AOUSC might influence the data coding process to be biased in
favor of the federal judiciary,444 all other professional
stakeholders in the federal court must be actively involved in
the entire coding process. Perhaps the AOUSC can continue to
use the ASFRG445 or commission a similar group to aid with
the coding process.
Second, the AOUSC and other institutional stakeholders
should continuously evaluate the coding questions’
effectiveness. Before rolling out the coding questions
nationally, the Advisory Committee, the FJC, the AOUSC, and
the ASFRG (or similar stakeholder group) should carefully test
and assess the proposed questions in pilot federal districts and
circuits. This process of course should be transparent with the
resulting data available to the public.

440. 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2) (2006).
441. For further discussion, see supra notes 185-90 and accompanying
text.
442. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 519.
443. Id. at 519 n.130 (collecting authorities); see also Alexander A.
Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 140 (2011);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil
Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in
the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1310-11 (2005);
Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1455 (2003).
444. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 515 & n.117.
445. For further discussion, see supra notes 299-302 and accompanying
text.
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Third, the only way the FCCEDD can provide an objective
descriptive baseline for policy debates is if it is maintained
with total transparency. The “process by which the data came
to be observed” must be recorded in detail.446 The FCCEDD’s
so-called “‘chain of evidence’”447 must be “fully documented and
unbroken.”448 Furthermore, the institutional stewards of this
data must respond to any legitimate criticisms thoughtfully
and timely and, most importantly, adopt necessary changes to
maintain the FCCEDD’s continuing credibility.
The best institutional steward of the FCCEDD and related
EBP research would be a dedicated independent research
organization.449 Such a federal dispute resolution research
agency could be called the National Academy of Justice (the
“NAJ”)450 and could be a federal justice addition to the National
Academies (the “NA”).451 Just as federal judges adjudicate
cases while the AOUSC keeps the lights on in judges’
chambers, the NAJ could handle substantive decisions about
the FCCEDD, while the AOUSC could handle the
administrative details. Moreover, the NAJ could serve as an
impartial monitor of policy experiments and report the results
to the Advisory Committee.452 The NAJ’s mission would be to
seek fundamental knowledge about the American federal
dispute resolution system and the application of that
knowledge to further the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of disputes. It either could be restricted to the
federal civil system or could include the federal criminal
system.

446. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 24.
447. A “chain of evidence” establishes that no unauthorized people have
had access to critical evidence. See DEBORAH MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS,
LEARNING EVIDENCE 124 (2d ed. 2012).
448. Epstein & King, supra note 101, at 24.
449. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
450. Accord Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 687.
451. The National Academies (“NA”) include the National Academy of
Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and
National
Research
Council.
About
Us,
THE
NAT’L
ACADS.,
http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/index.html (last visited Dec. 27,
2012) [hereinafter THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES].
452. See Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 910.
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The primary difference between the NAJ and other related
organizations such as the National Institute of Justice (the
“NIJ”) and the FJC is in organizational affiliation. Like the
NA,453 the NAJ would have institutional independence from all
government branches and enforce the highest standards of
research quality and merit review. In contrast, the NIJ and
FJC are affiliated respectively with the executive branch454 and
the judicial branch.455
Finally, the AOUSC and other institutional stakeholders
should not re-invent the wheel when gathering, archiving, and
coding the FCCEDD. Federal, state, and local governments456
and public and private organizations457 in the United States
and around the world continue to make constant innovations in
e-Government technology and infrastructure. The AOUSC
should comprehensively study such innovations (as they
undoubtedly already are). There also are well-established best
practices for authenticating, archiving, and coding multi-user
datasets. For example, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has drafted a Uniform
Electronic Legal Material Act that provides “an outcomesbased approach to the authentication and preservation of
electronic legal material.”458 Both the Dutch Data Archiving
453. See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 451.
454. A NA report on the NIJ concluded that the NIJ’s research has been
“severely hampered” by a lack of “independence” and “authority.” NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 2
(Charles Wellford et al., eds. 2010).
455. While the FJC is institutionally independent from the AOUSC, the
FJC remains the Advisory Committee’s primary researcher. See supra Part
III.B.2.
456. See generally GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF
THE INTERNET § 17.06 (2013).
457. One of the worldwide leaders in open government information is the
Legal Information Institute (“LII”) at Cornell University Law School. See
About LII, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/lii/about-lii (last
visited Jan. 20, 2013).
458. The Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Electronic
Legal
Material
Act
Summary,
UNIFORM
L.
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic
Legal
Material Act (last visited Jan. 26, 2013); see UNIF. LEGAL MATERIAL ACT
(2011),
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/AM2011_Prestyle%20Finals/UELM
A_PreStyleFinal_Jul11.pdf.
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and Networked Services (“DANS”) and the Swiss International
Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) Standard Reference
Model for an Open Archival Information System (“OAIS”) have
specific guidelines for data-archiving and sharing.459 The
FCCEDD should meet or exceed the DANS quality guidelines
and the OAIS standards.460 Likewise, the FJC should
comprehensively review the coding schemes employed by the
many available civil justice datasets461 and civil justice
empirical studies462 before the Advisory Committee drafts the
FCCEDD’s coding questions. When drafting these coding
questions, the FCCEDD should follow the ICPSR’s variable
codebook guidelines.463
Table 1 below lists some sample mandatory and voluntary
coding outcomes for a complaint or an answer.464 For simplicity,
Table 1 assumes one individual plaintiff and one individual
defendant with a civil lawsuit in federal district court. To
obtain the outcomes listed in Table 1, CM/ECF might need to
ask a number of follow-up questions with drop down menus465
or dialog boxes.466 Those questions are omitted from Table 1.
Table 1: Sample Complaint and Answer Mandatory and
Voluntary Coding Outcomes
Pleading Mandatory Outcomes
Voluntary Outcomes
Complaint Name of district court Plaintiff’s gender.
where filed.
Plaintiff’s age.
Date and time filed.
Plaintiff’s educational
Case number.
level.468
Case caption.
Lawyer’s age.
459. INTERUNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, supra
note 258, at 4-5.
460. Id.
461. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 16, at 493 (describing datasets).
462. See, e.g., ELS Bibliography, UCLA L., https://apps.law.ucla.edu/els/
(last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
463. INTERUNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, supra note
258, at 22-23.
464. FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a).
465. See supra note 8.
466. See supra note 9.
468. LoPucki, supra note 16, at 489 (explaining how these outcomes
“would add to the power of the data”).
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Pleading Mandatory Outcomes
Party
names
and
addresses.
For each claim:
Specific legal grounds
for
subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Specific legal grounds
for
personal
jurisdiction.
Specific legal grounds
for venue.
Specific federal or state
constitutional,
statutory, or common
law authority.
Specific
judgment
demanded and relief
sought to include type
and
amount
of
damages or equitable
relief.
Does the claim make a
“nonfrivolous argument
for
extending,
modifying, or reversing
existing law or for
establishing
new
law?”467
Is there a request for a
jury trial?
Total number of words
and paragraphs for:
Factual allegations.
Legal
or
mixed
factual/legal
allegations.
Total number of pages

143

Voluntary Outcomes
Lawyer’s
educational
information.
Lawyer’s
past
professional experience
in
relevant
specific
areas of law.
Lawyer’s
fee
arrangement.
Fee billed on preparing
the complaint.
Number of hours spent
on legal research.
Number of hours spent
drafting complaint.
Number of hours spent
on fact investigation.
Basic
diagnostic
knowledge
questions
about relevant areas of
law (e.g., knowledge of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009); Bell
Atlantic
Corp.
v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)).
Would you be willing to
be
interviewed
confidentially
by
a
researcher about your
complaint?

467. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
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Pleading Mandatory Outcomes
in complaint.
Specify allegations made
upon “information or
belief.”
If there are any exhibits:
Total
number
of
exhibits.
Name
and
general
purpose of each exhibit.
Civil
cover
sheet
completed?
Summons completed?
Certificate and Notice of
Interested Parties? If
yes,
specify
what
parties.
In
Forma
Pauperis
Application filed? If yes,
accepted or denied? On
what grounds?
Answer
Date and time filed.
For
each
crossreferenced paragraph in
the complaint:
Which part do you
admit?
Basis
for
admission.
Which part do you
deny? Basis for denial.
Which part(s) do you
lack
sufficient
information to answer
and deem denied?
For each affirmative
defense in the answer:
Specific federal or state
constitutional,
statutory, or common
law authority.

[Vol. 33:1

Voluntary Outcomes

Defendant’s gender.
Defendant’s age.
Defendant’s educational
level.
Lawyer’s
educational
information.
Lawyer’s
past
professional experience.
Lawyer’s
past
professional experience
in
relevant
specific
areas of law.
Lawyer’s
fee
arrangement.
Fee billed on preparing
the answer.
Number of hours spent
on legal research.
Number of hours spent
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Pleading Mandatory Outcomes
In response to what
claim in the complaint.
Total number of words
and
paragraphs
(omitting text copied
from the complaint) for:
Answering
factual
allegations.
Answering legal or
mixed
factual/legal
allegations.
Total number of pages
in the answer.
Specify allegations made
upon “information or
belief.”
If there are any exhibits:
Total
number
of
exhibits.
Name
and
general
purpose of each exhibit.

145

Voluntary Outcomes
drafting the answer.
Number of hours spent
on fact investigation.
Basic
diagnostic
knowledge
questions
about relevant areas of
law.
(e.g.,
knowledge
of
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at
544).
Did you talk to opposing
counsel before filing
your answer? If yes, for
how long and about
what?
Where there settlement
negotiations before you
filed the answer? If yes,
what
kind
of
negotiations, for what
kind of relief, and to
what result?
Would you be willing to
be
interviewed
confidentially
by
a
researcher about your
answer?

Conclusion
Federal civil rulemaking offers much promise for EBP. It
utilizes an expert committee structure insulated from, yet
accountable to, popular democracy.469 The Advisory Committee
appears sincerely interested in EBP470 and takes its time—
typically, three to five years—to evaluate proposed rules
469. For further discussion, see supra Part II.B.1.
470. For further discussion, see id.
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amendments.471 In addition, the Committee has an
independent, professional researcher, the FJC, to conduct any
empirical research the Committee needs.472 Moreover, the
increasing popularity of empiricism in the Academy facilitates
additional research.473 Such academic research also provides a
useful check on the FJC.474
But the expensive federal adversarial litigation system
also offers peril for EBP. EBP cannot avoid normative
concerns. Empirical research still must be interpreted through
a normative lens.475 The scope and limits of empirical research
are dictated by normative theory.476 And the adversarial
process provides often diametrically different normative lenses
through which to interpret empirical research.477
Take Rule 1, which states that the rules “should be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.”478 Just by what
standard? Determining the applicable standard of justice is a
normative concern. Different players in the litigation might
have different standards of justice. Justice might mean one
thing in a small, simple lawsuit and another in a complex class
action.479 Speedy according to whom? The plaintiff and the
defendant will have different normative conceptions of process
efficiency.480 Inexpensive according to whom? Do we factor in
larger societal or economic costs in the expense calculus or

471. See Kravitz, supra note 45, at 216-17.
472. For further discussion, see supra Part II.B.2.
473. For further discussion, see supra Part II.C.
474. Huw Davies et al., Introducing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice
in Public Services, in WHAT WORKS?, supra note 18, at 8.
475. See AYRES, supra note 34, at 124-128; LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82,
at 21. For further discussion, see supra Part I.A.
476. A “legal theory” is “a set of general propositions used as an
explanation” of law that are “sufficiently abstract to be relevant to more than
just particularized situations.” Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral:
The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1601
n.3 (1991). A normative theory is a legal theory about norms. For a definition
of “norms,” see supra note 56.
477. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
478. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
479. See Dimitrief et al., supra note 44, at 214.
480. See id. at 214-15.
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limit ourselves to the real costs of the actual parties?481
Although empirical research can and should inform
normative debates, it can never resolve them.482 Instead of
opposing empirical research, policymakers who insofar have
relied more on ideology, intuition, or experience should
recognize empirical research’s value-added contribution.483 The
best policy will employ all available tools. All policymakers
thus need at least to be familiar enough with empirical
methods to distinguish quality from shoddy research.484
Empirical research—particularly the objective descriptive data
for which this Article advocates—provides the best diagnostic
starting point for formulating new policy and the best
accountability for evaluating the effectiveness of implemented
or experimental policy. But empirical research alone cannot
answer normative questions.
In the civil litigation context, perhaps the greatest
normative question facing the federal courts today is how to
control access to the courts.485 Do we have too much litigation486
or is there a continuing need for private attorneys general to
enforce our existing laws?487 The current “restrictive ethos”488
in federal civil litigation conflicts with the “liberal ethos”
behind the original rules.489
In the past, fear, hysteria, and anecdote have dominated
this debate. Although normative ideology in such debates is
unavoidable, verifiable empirical assertions are cavalierly
tossed around without any accountability. EBP requires
policymakers to ante up the evidence behind such empirical
assertions. Policy debates that rely upon false factual
assertions are a disservice to the democratic process. As
481. Id. at 217.
482. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 82, at 21.
483. See, e.g., AYRES, supra note 34, at 11, 17.
484. For further discussion, see supra Part I.C.
485. See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901,
1906 (1989).
486. See id. at 1907-09.
487. Id.
488. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 358-66 (2010).
489. Id. at 353-57.
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Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan recognized: “Everyone is
entitled to his own opinions, but not to his own facts.”490
A cautionary tale of the misleading power of anecdote is
the myth of the excessiveness of the jury verdict in the
infamous McDonald’s coffee burn lawsuit, Liebeck v.
McDonald’s Restaurants.491 A dispassionate examination of the
actual facts of the case shows that the verdict was reasonably
based upon the considerable evidence of McDonald’s reckless
indifference.492 Despite the reasonableness of the final result,
media organizations neglected to do their homework and
instead uncritically accepted the tort-reform spin on the case.
For example, the influential Associated Press newswire service
dispensed with any pretense of objectivity and trumpeted the
verdict as an “absurd judgment” and “a stunning illustration of
what is wrong with America’s civil justice system.”493
As Judge Jack Weinstein has observed: “The truth about
the ‘litigation explosion’ is that it is a weapon of perception, not
substance. If the public can be persuaded that there is a
litigation crisis, it may support efforts to cut back on litigation
access.”494 Shoddy empirical research can be used to fuel
ideological arguments. For example, Ted Eisenberg’s work has
exposed the methodological flaws in a Chamber of Commerce
commissioned civil litigation empirical study.495
This Article does not attempt to take sides in this access to
justice debate. Arguments for increased access often are based
upon ideology as much as arguments for a so-called “litigation
explosion.”496 The questionable merit of some empirical studies
490. Clive Crook, The Unhealthy Politics of Health Care, BLOOMBERG
(June 26, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-06-26/healthcare-debate-shows-deeper-political-sickness.html.
491. See Michael McCann et al., Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical
Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113, 121 & n.28 (2001) (citing Liebeck v.
McDonald’s Rest., P.T.S., Inc., No. 93 Cv. 02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist.
Ct. 1994)).
492. Id. at 128.
493. Id. at 113 (quoting Associated Press, Woman Burned by Hot
McDonald’s Coffee Gets $2.9 Million, Aug. 18, 1994).
494. Weinstein, supra note 485, at 1909.
495. See Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability
Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
969, 969-70 (2009).
496. Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 690-91 (collecting
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advocating fewer lawsuits does not diminish the legitimate
ideological reasons for a less litigious society.497 But while antilitigation advocates are entitled to their own opinions, they are
not entitled to their own facts.
The modest point of this Article is to establish baseline
objective data like the FCCEDD with which to evaluate the
unavoidable normative choices our democracy makes.498 As
Bogenschneider and Corbett astutely noted, “stimulat[ing] a
dialogue between those who spend most of their time producing
knowledge (researchers, evaluators, and analysts), those who
focus on the utilization of knowledge (legislators, agency
executives, and program managers), and all those
intermediaries who assist these officials” is a “modest” way “to
improve the quality of government by bringing more rationality
to the governance process.”499 A shared source of relevant,
representative, and reliable500 descriptive data like the
FCCEDD can promote such dialogue. An enlightened
dictatorship that forced everyone to act only in ways supported
by empirical evidence would best implement EBP. But we do
not have a dictatorship and presumably do not want one.
As the ancient Greeks recognized, one of the costs of
democracy is the risk of the public being swayed by popular
hysteria or emotion.501 Law unavoidably has conflicting goals.
In the civil litigation context, as Rule 1 fails to recognize,
“justice” for the individual often conflicts with “speed” and
“inexpense” in litigation.502 As Marc Galanter observed: “Civil
justice issues involve value choices—and that means political
choices. But an enhanced knowledge base can rescue us from a
debate dominated by bogus questions and fictional facts.”503
authorities).
497. See, e.g., PHILLIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW
LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1995).
498. For further discussion, see supra Part I.B.
499. BOGENSCHNEIDER & CORBETT, supra note 18, at xii.
500. Solesbury, supra note 18, at 8-9.
501. See, e.g., Polybius, Histories, Book III, in 2 POLYBIUS: THE
HISTORIES (Loeb Classical Library ed. 1922-1927), available at
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/3*.html
(last
visited Dec. 28, 2012).
502. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
503. Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil
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Menkel-Meadow and Garth recognized that the best empirical
research can, at most, only inform these value choices:
There is very little that social science research
and data can do to help resolve the fundamental
questions about what purpose(s) courts serve and
for whom (dispute resolution for the parties or
public law generation for the larger society?). At
best, social science research can help us to
understand if particular rules are more or less
likely to let in particular claims or particular
claimants or whether particular procedural
systems disproportionately serve particular
kinds of cases or litigants.504
Perhaps as a democracy we have decided in civil litigation
disproportionately to serve the “Haves.”505 That is a political
choice. If true, then let us gather accurate empirical data about
the consequences of that political choice so that the American
public and its policymakers can choose with their eyes wide
open. Such public, institutionalized empirical accountability of
democratic decision making may be the ultimate realization of
the legal realist project.506 Empirical research “just strips away
all the roadblocks that you might have or at least it makes
them bare. If the people are going to make a . . . decision” based
on politics contrary to the research findings, “then they are
going to make it despite the facts.”507
The unique circumstances of federal civil rulemaking and
the CM/ECF system provide an unparalleled opportunity for
EBP. This Article hopes that the Advisory Committee will
seriously consider adopting the Model Rule508 and
Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 102 (1993).
504. Menkel-Meadow & Garth, supra note 107, at 699-700.
505. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974), available at
http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/~phelps/Galanter%201974.pdf.
506. For further discussion about legal realism and new legal realism,
see supra Part II.C.
507. AYRES, supra note 34, at 79-80 (quoting economist Paul Gertler
about randomized trial evaluation).
508. For further discussion, see supra Part IV.A.
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implementing the contemporaneous coding of CM/ECF cases to
create the FCCEDD.509 Mandating such coding would provide
not only an invaluable, publicly accessible empirical baseline
with which to assess federal civil rulemaking, but also an
excellent example of how EBP can inform the difficult policy
choices in democratic government.
Following the federal courts’ lead, all branches of
democratic government at local, state, and national levels could
mandate that policymakers during the policymaking process
must contemporaneously code outcomes into a publicly
available, searchable electronic database. While perhaps not as
formally as in litigation, all lawmaking relies to some extent on
the adversarial process and a professional duty of candor.
Legislation or regulations could formally assign fact-checking
duties to institutional players in the policymaking process or to
independent civil servants to safeguard the objectivity of these
databases.
Publicly available electronic descriptive databases of
policymaking outcomes are a simple way to leverage technology
to provide comprehensive, reliable, and inexpensive evidence
for EBP. Easy access to these objective empirical baselines
would encourage both policymakers and the public to focus
more on facts and less on politics.

509. For further discussion, see supra Part IV.B.
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